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 Summary 
Despite rapid growth and progress towards some MDGs, human security in Bangladesh is 
widely perceived to be poor. This study developed a methodology for human security 
assessment based on a dual track approach: developing scores for six categories of human 
security and cross-checking with changes in drivers of insecurity identified through an 
independent analysis of each category of insecurity. We reached a number of important 
conclusions about the weakness of the existing data as well as areas of significant human 
insecurity that can be identified using the available evidence and an analysis of drivers.  
 
i) The Available Data are too weak to allow a credible tracking of human security over 
time. The available data on human security in Bangladesh is not usable for credible 
assessments of levels of human security or for tracking trends. It is primarily based on 
collations of newspaper reports and as a result, suffers from wide differences between 
reporting agencies, significant differences in the magnitude and direction of year to year 
changes reported by different agencies, and do not allow scaling up to the national level to 
assess levels of risk in an objective manner. Our recommendation is to commission periodic 
sample surveys on critical human security indicators. Even relatively small sample surveys 
would enable assessment and tracking that was credible on statistical grounds. However, the 
available data and our analysis of the drivers of different categories of insecurity enabled us 
to identify a number of relevant conclusions for policy.  
 
ii) Factional Political Competition is an important cross-cutting driver of insecurity. A 
number of powerful crosscutting drivers affect most of the important human security 
categories in Bangladesh. In particular, the political accumulation strategies of patron-client 
factions play a critical role in driving moderate to high levels of human insecurity. Intense 
factional political competition directly results in many types of human insecurity. In addition, 
it affects the operation of the administrative and judicial systems, contributes to land and 
asset related conflicts, exacerbates the insecurity faced by religious and other community 
groups, and sustains criminal gangs. While the main drivers of this competition can only be 
addressed in the medium to long term, we need to distinguish between ‘normal’ levels of 
insecurity driven by structural features of factional competition and ‘exceptional’ levels that 
signal significant structural or cyclical variations. 
 
iii) Creating legitimate opportunities for the ‘intermediate classes’ is likely to have 
strong positive effects for human security. Political competition between factions is led by 
political entrepreneurs from the ‘intermediate classes’ and is in turn driven by the limited 
attractiveness of the employment and accumulation opportunities open to these politically 
powerful classes. A policy recommendation is that while pro-poor spending is justified on 
welfare grounds, the creation of employment and accumulation opportunities for the lower 
middle classes (who are also quite poor in absolute terms) is likely to have strong positive 
effects for human security over time. 
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e-mail: mk17@soas.ac.uk. This assessment was commissioned by DFID and drew on assessments of human 
security in 6 different categories provided by three Bangladeshi researchers. These are listed in the references 
page of this report. Only the author is responsible for the overall analysis of this report.  
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iv) A clientelist political system can provide moderate human security if the balance of 
power between factions forces a ‘live and let live’ compromise. The ‘normal’ operation of 
a moderately stable patron-client polity requires a regular cycling of factions in power, and 
stable expectations of the excluded that they will have their turn at political accumulation 
soon. This ‘live and let live’ compromise between leading factions is critical for moderate 
security to be achieved. One of the triggers that led to a precipitate decline of security in 
Bangladesh from 2005 onwards was the attempt by a faction within the then ruling party to 
monopolize power and control access to lucrative political accumulation prospects. 
Unfortunately, outsiders are unlikely to be of much help in engineering the emergence of a 
favourable balance of power between factions, but a better understanding can at least avoid 
strategies that are unlikely to be of much help. There is also room for optimism that the 
balance of power between the many political factions in Bangladesh will in the long run 
prevent monopolization by any particular faction. The problem is that every faction has to 
recognize this reality and outsiders can help by initiating a more open discussion of these 
issues without engaging with the obfuscating ideological conflicts entertained by the parties. 
 
v) Fiscal constraints are critical for explaining the persistence of patron-client politics 
and the insecurity associated with it. Fiscal constraints that are a feature of 
underdevelopment means that improvements in governance across the board or political 
stability based on social democracy are unlikely to be feasible very soon. Improving the fiscal 
space to pay for security and for redistributive strategies that benefit the socially powerful 
intermediate classes is critical for long run stability. 
 
vi) The reform focus should be to achieve better human security in a small number of 
critical sectors. Pragmatic reforms can be pursued to weaken some of the drivers of human 
security, and we discuss some important ones in connection with each of our categories. 
There are two aspects of human security that are simultaneously critical. One concerns the 
security of individuals and sectors critical for driving economic growth, whose security is 
disproportionately important for broader society. A second is the security of particularly 
vulnerable individuals and groups. Social policy should be concerned with a selection of 
critical areas of both types. For instance, policy needs to focus on reducing the human 
insecurity associated with critical land rights that are important for economic growth as well 
as the land rights of very vulnerable social groups. 
 
vii) Exaggerating the threat of Islamist radicalism is counterproductive. Our analysis of 
the drivers of the spike in Islamist activity in 2005 suggests that this was driven largely by 
factional competition between mainstream parties exploiting small Islamist factions who pose 
a very small threat on their own. Over-emphasizing the latent danger of international Islamist 
networks entering Bangladesh is paradoxically likely to actually encourage the emergence of 
new Islamist factions and the alignment of existing factions with international Islamist forces 
to increase the price they can extract for supporting mainstream coalitions. 
 
viii) Robust and authoritarian responses to security (like RAB or military interventions 
to resolve factional political conflicts) are not sustainable solutions. RAB is the latest in a 
long line of robust responses which began with the Rakkhi Bahini of the early 1970s. These 
institutional responses achieve immediate results but they do not address the critical drivers 
of insecurity addressed in this study and are at risk of being absorbed into the clientelist 




Bangladesh has achieved considerable success in the last two decades in terms of economic 
growth and progress towards some critical MDGs. With growth rates of 5.2% per annum over 
2000-04, Bangladesh was one of several Asian economies enjoying a sustained growth spurt 
over two decades. But there is a widespread perception, not least within Bangladesh, that in 
terms of governance and aspects of wellbeing related to human security, performance has not 
improved over this period and some aspects of human security may even be deteriorating. 
Personal security and the security of property is a serious concern for many Bangladeshis. 
(As if to underline the seriousness of the situation, one of our Bangladeshi researchers was 
stabbed and robbed while this assessment was being carried out). Political violence and 
instability also remain persistent drivers of insecurity despite the hopes raised at the time of 
Bangladesh’s transition to democracy in 1991.  
 
There is clearly an anomalous relationship in Bangladesh (and in many other developing 
countries) between economic growth, progress towards the MDGs and progress towards other 
aspects of human security. We need a better understanding of these relationships, and in 
particular of the drivers of a range of critical human security conditions that go beyond the 
governance conditions normally considered in economic and governance assessments. Our 
aim in this assessment is to provide a framework for an ongoing assessment of the broader 
human security situation in Bangladesh that can identify levels and changes in levels of 
human security and to identify the implications for policy. This first assessment is for 2005. 
 
Section 2 summarizes the methodology used in this assessment. Section 3 discusses the data 
limitations we faced, the immediate ways in which we went around these limitations, and our 
suggestions for better data collection to achieve more coherent assessments in the future. 
Section 4 discusses the second plank of our assessment, the analysis of the drivers of different 
types of human security. Section 5 provides our assessment of human security in Bangladesh 




This section discusses two issues: the types of human security that we will be assessing, and 
our methodology for assessing levels and trends.  
 
i) What do we mean by human security and why should we assess it? 
Development is a multi-faceted process that includes but is not limited to economic 
development. Drawing on this consensus view of development, the United Nations defined 
broader freedom as the presence of conditions that ensure ‘freedom from want, freedom from 
fear and the freedom to live in dignity’ (Annan 2005). We draw on this definition to define 
human security in the broadest sense to mean the achievement of all of these freedoms. The 
achievement of freedom from want requires progress on economic security and this is already 
extensively assessed in assessments of economic growth, progress towards the MDGs, 
poverty reduction, and changes in income distribution. In this assessment we concentrate on 
other aspects of broader freedom that are normally ignored in these types of economic 
assessments. This is shown in Figure 1. 
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 Figure 1 Economic Security and Broader Human Security4
 
 
Our focus is on the most important of the excluded aspects of human security. Progress in 
economic security is already extensively assessed in Bangladesh and in other developing 
countries in economic surveys that assess growth in national income, changes in income 
distribution, changes in poverty levels, and so on. However, a very wide range of conditions 
may be relevant for assessing progress in achieving broader freedom in terms of greater 
freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity. The range of conditions that may 
potentially be relevant is far too large to be practically assessed in a comprehensive way. 
Some judgement has to be exercised to determine the conditions that are the most relevant in 
each country context. To identify the most relevant aspects of broader human security in 
Bangladesh, we used a consultation exercise (see Appendix A) to determine the categories of 
human security that Bangladeshi stakeholders and development partners believed were most 
relevant for understanding impediments to broader development in the Bangladeshi context.   
 
Our consultation exercise focused on the non-economic aspects of human security and 
through it we identified a number of areas of concern that we then grouped into six broad 
categories. The factors driving insecurity in each of these categories are not necessarily 
exclusive to that category as there are important crosscutting factors and issues affecting 
multiple categories. The six categories (in no particular order) look at different aspects of 
human insecurity that are broadly associated with or result from  
 
A) Characteristics of politics and the political system (threats to the security of persons 
and their property coming from the operation of political competition between parties 
and factions that affect the right of people to live in freedom from fear and their right to 
live in dignity), 
B) Conflicts over property (threats to the security of persons and their property coming 
from the contestation and conflicts over property including land, water bodies, and 
natural resources that affect the right of people to live in freedom from fear and their 
right to live in dignity), 
C) Characteristics of the administrative and judicial systems (threats to the security of 
persons and their property coming from the misuse, malfunctioning or lack of capacity 
of administrative and justice systems including the bureaucracy, security services and 
the administration of justice that affect the right of people to live in freedom from fear 
and their right to live in dignity), 
D) Violence and discrimination against women (threats to the security of women and 
their property coming from political, administrative, legal, and cultural discrimination 
against women that affect the right of women and girls to live in freedom from fear and 
their right to live in dignity), 
E) Violence and discrimination against ethnic, religious and other community 
groups (threats to the security of ethnic, religious and other community groups and 
their property coming from political, administrative, legal, and cultural discrimination 
against these groups that affect the right of individuals in these groups to live in 
freedom from fear and their right to live in dignity), and  
F) Crime (threats to the security of persons and their property coming from all types of 
crime and extortion that affect the right of people to live in freedom from fear and their 
right to live in dignity). 
 
Clearly, many other areas of human security could potentially be identified that are important 
for achieving progress towards the broadly defined freedom from fear and to live in dignity. 
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Our assessment focuses only on those aspects of human security that were identified as most 
relevant for the Bangladeshi context, rather than attempting a comprehensive assessment. The 
available evidence on human security in Bangladesh was collected for this assessment by 
three Bangladeshi researchers who produced reports on each of these categories. 
 
As our categories were identified through a consultative process, the extent and causes of 
human insecurity in these categories are important for policy-makers in their own right. But 
secondly, all of our categories of human security are broadly related to governance issues 
(such as the stability of property rights and political stability) that can be expected to affect 
and be affected by economic growth (see Figure 1). This relationship may not be immediately 
obvious because the relationship may be complex and non-linear. For instance, relatively 
rapid economic progress may be possible with low levels of human security in some or all of 
our non-economic categories (as is clearly the case in Bangladesh and many other developing 
countries) but a worsening of human security in some of these areas may eventually have 
disproportionately negative effects on economic performance. Identifying potential areas of 
vulnerability and tracking human insecurity in these areas may therefore be important for 
sustaining progress in other areas of human security directly related to economic growth and 
poverty reduction. For both sets of reasons, an assessment and analysis of human security in 
these categories can assist development policy and complement economic assessments. 
 
ii) Methodology for Assessing Human Security  
Ideally, a credible assessment of levels and changes in human security should approach the 
problem from a number of different angles that allows measures to be cross-checked. The 
method we developed for this assessment is shown in Figure 2. The first component is a 
scoring exercise to give a score to human security in each of our six categories (box 1 in 
Figure 2). While this is critically important for assessments over time, the available data in 
Bangladesh did not allow the immediate attribution of scores to our human security 
categories. This is because the data available did not allow a credible extrapolation to 
estimate the extent of insecurity at the national level. A scoring exercise is, however, 
important if changes in levels of security are to be identified, so we establish a methodology 
that could be used, together with a sampling strategy to provide appropriate data for a scoring 
exercise in the future. The available data only allowed us to derive possible directions of 
change in levels of human security in 2005, and even that with low levels of confidence, but 
we use this for the 2005 assessment exercise.  
 
The second component of a credible assessment (box 2 in Figure 2) is to analyse the drivers 
of insecurity in each category, distinguishing between drivers of cyclical variations and of 
longer-term trends in human insecurity. The third and final step is to compare observed 
changes in levels identified in component 1 (or in our case qualitative information about the 
direction of change in levels using the limited data currently available) with evidence of 
changes in the drivers of insecurity analysed in component 2. If a change in drivers 
corresponds with an observed change in levels of human security, this corroborates our 
observation and enhances our confidence in observed changes. Moreover, the analysis of 
drivers and our observation of changes in drivers can also help to identify whether observed 
changes in levels of security are due to changes in long-term trends or are cyclical changes. 
The difference between the two is important for determining appropriate policy responses.  
 
The output of the full assessment is to report levels and changes in levels of human security, 
to identify the nature of these changes (trends or cycles), identify crosscutting issues and 
discuss the policy implications. As scoring was not possible for this immediate exercise, we 
 6
have not provided scores for our categories for 2005, but we have used the available data and 
evidence on possible directions of change in levels of human security, together with an 
analysis of drivers and crosscutting issues to identify the likely trends in human insecurity in 
each category, identify the likely nature of these changes and to identify the most important 
policy implications.  
 
 
Figure 2 Methodology of Human Security Assessment 
Human Security Assessment
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3. DATA REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS 
This section discusses the data requirements for an effective implementation of the 
methodology summarized in Figure 2. We discuss first, the data required for an effective 
assessment and scoring exercise, secondly, the type of data that is actually available in 
Bangladesh and its limitations, and finally, the steps that could be taken to generate more 
appropriate data in the future.  
 
i) Data Requirements  
Effective assessment requires a measure of the level of insecurity in our different categories 
that can be compared over time and that is transparent enough to be replicated by other 
observers. To achieve this in a credible manner requires some minimum data requirements, 
not only because the assessment involves making judgements about situations that are 
difficult to measure, but also because any judgement is likely to be controversial and 
therefore has to be as free as possible from subjective biases.  
 
For comparisons over time, we need a simple numerical score for the level of human 
insecurity in each category. We agreed on a simple scale that ranks the degree of insecurity in 
each category on a scale from 1 (lowest level of insecurity) to 4 (highest level of insecurity). 
However, to avoid subjectivity, scores cannot be simply based on ‘expert opinion’ as these 
can be justifiably ignored by those who disagree with the judgement. Our proposed method is 
designed to overcome many of the objections of subjective bias faced by existing scoring 
methods.  
 
The proposed scoring methodology is discussed more fully in Appendix C. Our method is to 
break down each of our broadly defined categories into a number of more narrowly defined 
sub-categories where transparent judgements can be reached about the proportions of the 
potentially affected population that may be affected by insecurity of a particular type or 
severity in a particular year. This method reduces the potential of subjective bias to its 
minimum. While the assessor is still making a judgement based on extrapolating the available 
data and evidence, the judgement is about proportions of affected population, and others with 
better data or evidence can update or challenge the assessment in a transparent way (Box 1 
provides an example). 
 
Box 1 Scoring Human Security: An Example 
Consider category (i), “human insecurity resulting from characteristics of politics and the 
political system”. A credible score for a broadly defined category such as this can only be based 
on assessments of a number of narrowly defined sub-categories that cover an adequate range of 
types of insecurity within the category.  
 
The number of sub-categories can be relatively small (between 3 and 5 for each category) as 
the intention is not to be exhaustive but to select sub-categories that shed light on important 
aspects of insecurity within a category. In particular, sub-categories should be selected to 
capture types of insecurity faced by different economic classes, geographical regions, and so 
on. For instance, the insecurity faced by a landless peasant may be very different from that 
faced by an urban professional. However, if we cover a few of the most important sub-
categories, the aggregate of these scores can give us a credible score for insecurity for that 
category of human security that can be compared over time.  
 
As an example, suppose we decide that one of the sub-categories within category (i) is violence 
faced by members of political parties in the course of political activism. This sub-category 
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focuses on a particular target group as political activists in Bangladesh come primarily from the 
intermediate (middle and lower middle) classes. The scoring then involves a number of steps.  
 
Step 1. Using national or comparative data we establish the likely upper and lower bounds for 
the proportions of the affected population that define the worst and best scores for this sub-
category for that country. The upper bound is the ‘nightmare scenario’ that is nevertheless 
imaginable as a possible scenario for the country. Let us say that comparative evidence or past 
history suggests that the nightmare scenario (defining the highest level of insecurity) is reached 
when more than 15% of individuals involved in political activism in the country are victims of 
violence during a year.  
 
We may judge that at these levels, small increases in violence no longer matter as the country 
had already reached the most dangerous levels of insecurity. Then an assessment that 15% or 
more of political party members suffered from violence would score 4 on our scale. At the 
other extreme, we can define the lower bound (the highest level of security) in the country as a 
situation where less than 5% of party members face violence. The highest score need not be 
reserved for a zero level of violence because while zero violence is desirable, blips within a low 
range could be expected even if the highest feasible level of security is achieved in any country, 
particularly a developing one. The low level that is selected would correspond to a score of 1.  
 
Both the highest and lowest levels should be scaled such that reaching these levels is 
imaginable for the country concerned, otherwise the country would be stuck on an intermediate 
score purely because of an inappropriate scaling of the range. Intermediate scores would be in 
between the upper and lower bounds. In our example, 5-10% would score 2, and 10-15% would 
score 3.  
 
Step 2. The team then evaluates the available data and evidence to provide an assessment of the 
proportions of the relevant population that are affected by this particular insecurity. While this 
is a judgement, it is a transparent judgement about scale that others can challenge on the basis 
of alternative data sources or other evidence. But critically, this judgement can only be made if 
the available data can be used to estimate the proportions affected for the relevant population 
at the national level.  
 
Step 3. The assessment team indicates a confidence level for each score to indicate the quality 
of the underlying data on which their extrapolation to the national level was made (see our 
Methodology Appendix C for details). The confidence level could range from very high 
(census or near-census data available) to very low (very patchy and partial data extrapolated by 
the assessor).  
 
Step 4. The scores for the different sub-categories are then aggregated to provide a score for the 
category.  
 
Our proposed methodology allows us to focus on sub-categories where data should have been 
available to reach transparent judgements about security levels. We do not need 
comprehensive data on every aspect of human security. We only need data and evidence on 
some critical sub-categories that can be used to shed light on the likely level of human 
security in each category.  
 
ii) Data Limitations in Bangladesh  
Despite the limited data requirements we set for ourselves, we found that the type and quality 
of secondary data available in Bangladesh precluded any scoring of human insecurity in any 
category or sub-category that we looked at. This was an unexpected finding, particularly 
given the large amount of data that was being collected on human insecurity in Bangladesh 
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by NGOs and others. Unfortunately, all of this data is ‘collected’ in a way that makes it 
unsuitable for reaching informed judgements about the levels of insecurity that could be 
compared over time.  
 
Almost all of the available data on human insecurity in Bangladesh are based on tabulating 
newspaper and media accounts of particular types of insecurity (for instance deaths due to 
political violence). As the sum totals of newspaper reports in any particular year are clearly 
not based on scientific sampling methods (nor should we expect them to be), this data cannot 
be used to extrapolate either the extent of insecurity in any particular year or to compare 
changes in the level of insecurity across years even at the lowest level of confidence.  
 
The sampling problem we are referring to emerges not because the data collecting agencies 
are arbitrary in their sampling of newspapers, but rather that newspapers are not obliged to 
follow any consistent sampling strategy or follow strict categorization rules in reporting 
stories from month to month or year to year. This makes the media-derived data on human 
insecurity in Bangladesh entirely inappropriate for a credible assessment of human security 
for at least four reasons.  
 
i) Newspapers are often reporting events before the full facts are known and in many cases, 
incidents of human insecurity may be misclassified. For instance, violence due to land 
conflicts may be misreported as political violence or communal violence and vice versa. This 
is particularly likely because each incident typically has multiple drivers and only trained 
personnel following a transparent methodology can reliably identify the dominant 
characteristic of different incidents in a consistent way. Relying on newspaper reports for a 
classification of human insecurity in different categories has significant dangers.  
 
ii) Stories that are interesting for newspapers need not reflect a full coverage of different 
types of human security or include the most important types. For instance, newspapers may 
cover deaths of political activists much more prominently than deaths or asset losses of 
landless peasants. There may be occasional stories about the latter but little detail of 
magnitudes or the processes involved. As a result, the categories covered in NGO data on 
human security are very partial. 
 
iii) We have no way of knowing whether year-to-year variations in the total numbers reported 
are due to random variations in newspaper coverage or reflect real changes in underlying 
insecurity. For instance, it is possible that an increase in coverage of a particular type of 
insecurity may reflect growing public or international concern with a particular type of 
insecurity rather than a real increase. 
 
iv) We have no way of knowing what percentage of the population is covered by newspaper 
reporting, so we have no way of extrapolating from newspaper reports to the national figure. 
This is particularly important because if we take the absolute figures reported for numbers of 
people affected by different types of insecurity in Bangladesh, they are often extremely low 
for a country of over 130 million people. If we are unable to extrapolate to the national level 
we have no way of identifying levels of risk for different population groups even to orders of 
magnitude. Box 2 summarizes some of the characteristics of the data available in Bangladesh. 
The problems described are ultimately due to the sourcing of this data primarily on media 




Box 2 Limitations in the Human Security Data Available in Bangladesh  
 
i) Very large differences in figures reported by different agencies. 
Consider for instance the figures reported for deaths due to political violence. In 2004, ASK 
(Ain O Shalish Kendro) report 62 deaths (based on scanning 12 newspapers) while Odhikar 
reported a figure almost 10 times higher, 526 deaths (based on 18 newspapers). The ratio of 
almost 1:10 in the figures of these two agencies is repeated in 2005 (see Appendix B Table 
A.1). However, when we look at figures for injuries in political conflicts, the figures from the 
two agencies are comparable, suggesting that the differences are not just due to differences in 
the numbers of newspapers scanned by the two agencies, but more likely due to differences in 
the coverage and definition of different types of incidents by different newspapers (Appendix B 
Table A.2). It is also unclear what steps agencies take and how effective they are in avoiding 
problems of double counting when multiple papers report the same incidents. 
 
Another example of great variations in reported insecurity is provided by figures for violence 
against women (often described as ‘physical torture’ of women in the Bangladeshi literature). 
The reporting agencies do not precisely define the types of violence included in this category 
and this undoubtedly contributes to the huge variance in reported figures. In 2005 Bangladesh 
Mahila Parishad reported 1350 cases of violence against women, while the Bangladesh 
National Women Lawyers’ Association (BNWLA) report barely 10% of that number, 137 
incidents, and Karmajibi Nari report a mere 88 cases. Remarkably, all these figures are serious 
underestimates compared to the figure for reported cases of violence against women recorded at 
the Bangladesh Police Headquarters, which recorded 2945 cases of reported violence against 
women (Appendix B Figure D.1 and Table D.1). As the police figures are themselves far from 
comprehensive, this underlines the seriousness of the gaps in some of the figures coming from 
newspapers.  
 
Similarly, 2005 figures for rape provided by NGOs and women’s associations are roughly 30% 
of the figure of rape cases recorded by the Bangladesh Police Headquarters (Appendix B Table 
D.1 and Table D.3). But in contrast, the same NGOs and women’s organizations report roughly 
8 times more murders of women in 2005 compared to the 117 murders reported by the 
Bangladesh Police Headquarters (Appendix B Table D.1 and Table D.5).  
 
ii) Very large differences in year-to-year changes reported, both in magnitude and 
direction of change. 
Given the staggering differences in the coverage of different agencies, it is not surprising that 
when it comes to reporting year-to-year changes, for a large number of data categories different 
agencies frequently record different directions of change (and not just different magnitudes of 
change).  
 
For instance, looking at the figure for murders of women in 2005 compared to 2004, 
Bangladesh Mahila Parishad records a small rise of 12%, BNWLA records a significant drop in 
the number of murders by 67%, while Karmajibi Nari records a huge rise of 195% (Appendix 
B Table D.5). A quick glance through the tables in Appendix B shows that these discrepancies 
are the norm for most data categories.  
 
This could be due to poor tabulation and different ways in which double counting is dealt with 
by different agencies, but also to random changes in coverage of different types of incidents by 
different newspapers, each of which has different editorial policies for deciding 
newsworthiness. A slightly different sample of newspapers could then result in different 
directions of change being reported. 
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iii) Data missing for assessing many critical sub-categories.  
Newspaper-based data are not classified in ways that allow us to distinguish between 
insecurities faced by different income classes, or urban and rural populations. Reports on many 
other types of insecurities are altogether missing. For instance, if we are interested in the extent 
of insecurity faced by poor and landless people when their (limited) assets come under threat or 
are grabbed by more powerful individuals or factions, we find no figures on this. Perhaps there 
are insufficient newspaper mentions of these events to generate even limited data. But we know 
that these are significant social processes that contribute to considerable human insecurity for 
large classes of Bangladesh’s population.  
 
iv) Absolute numbers reported are relatively low, with no information that would allow 
scaling up to the national level. 
This is the most fundamental problem which precludes any attempt at using newspaper-based 
data for an assessment exercise. An assessment of human security has to be able to scale up 
from samples to a national figure for proportions of population affected. This is impossible 
using newspaper figures without having independent estimates of the percentage of the total 
affected population covered by these newspapers. What we do know is that the figures 
emerging from newspaper reports are relatively small in absolute magnitude.  
 
For instance, if Bangladesh in 2005 had the same incidence of rape as the US (62.5 per 100,000 
females), there would have been roughly 40,000 rapes in Bangladesh. In contrast, if Bangladesh 
had the incidence observed in England and Wales (43 per 100,000 females), there would have 
been roughly 28,000 cases of rape in 2005. But NGOs and women’s organizations report under 
1000 rapes in Bangladesh in 2005 while the Bangladesh Police HQ figure is 2797 (Appendix B 
Tables D.1 and D.3).  
 
Clearly, the figures for rape reported by newspapers in Bangladesh are a ‘sample’ but we have 
no sampling information that would enable us to scale these figures to the national level. So we 
have no way of knowing whether Bangladeshi women in 2005 faced the UK level of risk, the 
US level of risk or a very different level of risk altogether. Without being able to scale the risk 
in this way, there is no credible way in which human insecurity can be assessed or compared 
over time.  
 
Similarly, consider the insecurity faced by Hindus who risk becoming victims of communal 
violence. From newspaper data, ASK reports that in 2004, 12 Hindus were killed in communal 
violence (Appendix B Table E.4). Even if we take at face value the newspaper classification of 
the cause of these deaths, we face a fundamental problem. There are roughly 13 million Hindus 
in Bangladesh and if 12 died in 2004 as a result of violence directed against this community 
(less than 1 per 1,000,000), the insecurity of Bangladesh’s Hindu minority due to ‘hate-driven 
violence’ would be lower than that of many ethnic minority groups in the UK. Of course, in this 
case too, 12 is a ‘sample’ picked by a collection of newspapers, but we have no statistical 
information to scale this (or any other figures for deaths due to communal violence) to the 
national level.  
 
This scaling problem applies to the data available for every category of human security that we 
wish to assess.  
 
The data weaknesses summarized in Box 2 were so serious that we could not even establish 
orders of magnitude (that is how many zeros to put after a figure for the numbers affected at 
the national level) for any type of insecurity at any level of confidence. This also means that 
at the moment we cannot determine the appropriate higher and lower bounds for scores in 
different sub-categories of insecurity. This has to await preliminary results of a sample survey 
so that scores can be appropriately calibrated.  
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We were forced to conclude that the large amounts of data collected on human insecurity in 
Bangladesh (often with donor support) are statistically useless for a credible assessment 
exercise. As newspapers are not responsible for collecting statistics on a sound sampling 
basis, this is not a criticism of Bangladeshi newspapers, but it is a serious criticism of the data 
collection strategies of agencies that are attempting to monitor levels and trends in human 
insecurity of different types.  
 
These weaknesses are of particular concern because the resources could have been better 
spent on collecting data that was more usable. Of no less concern is that this weak data is 
being used by international agencies, (including the US State Department and others) to make 
judgements about levels and changes in human insecurity affecting Bangladesh. 
 
iii) Proposed methodology for data generation for future scoring exercise  
A recommendation of this report is that to achieve credible assessments of human security we 
need to consider carrying out annual or other regular sample surveys. The household samples 
could be relatively small if they were carefully stratified according to the national mix of 
regions, income classes, religious communities, and so on. The survey would seek to 
enumerate the incidence of events within the sample that fall within the categories of 
insecurity being assessed.  
 
A sample survey would solve two problems. First, it would provide scalable data on the sub-
categories we are interested in, so we could extrapolate from the sample figures to estimates 
of national figures with tolerable levels of confidence. Secondly, a sampling approach would 
allow us to generate data in areas where none exists in terms of newspaper-based data. For 
instance, the sample survey could be used estimate the proportion of the poor who faced 
threats of asset loss in a year or the proportion who suffered physical violence in connection 
with asset grabbing.  
 
A sampling approach could also establish degrees of confidence in the data in different sub-
categories. For any sub-category of human insecurity, an incident reported by a household 
affecting one of its members could be followed up by on-the-spot verification by third parties 
(neighbours, police records where relevant, and so on) or reported as unverified. This would 
establish confidence levels about the veracity of what was reported as well as confidence in 
its classification in a particular category of insecurity.  
 
The minimum required sample size would depend on the categories that were being assessed. 
As some categories affect only a subset of the whole population (for instance, some minority 
groups are relatively small), to include an adequate sample of these sub-populations, the total 
sample would have to be larger. But a sample size of roughly 1500 to 2000 households could 
provide statistically usable results for most of our categories in an assessment exercise. The 
sample results can then be used to extrapolate to national levels and used with our scoring 
methodology to produce credible national human insecurity scores. Not all sub-categories of 
human insecurity are amenable to assessment by sample surveys because of the sensitivity of 
respondents. For instance, credible figures for rapes are unlikely to be collected through such 
a method. A sample survey approach would have to exclude sub-categories where this 
method is likely to yield biased results. However, related sub-categories (violence against 
women, murders or suicides) may give closely correlated information about changes in levels 
of insecurity faced by women. For sub-categories or categories that are not suitable for a 
sample survey approach, available figures from other sources can be assessed or improved to 
provide a crosscheck. For instance, trends in police figures for reported rapes could be used 
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to provide a crosscheck to the trends emerging from data for other sub-categories of 
insecurity faced by women.  
 
The proposed method would mitigate many of the problems of subjectivity that have 
prevented assessments of insecurity or governance quality being taken seriously by those who 
disagree with the levels identified. Our evaluation of the available data should also alert 
national and international agencies to the dangers of using the existing data to assess the state 
of human security in Bangladesh. More details on a workable methodology are provided in 
Appendix C. 
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4. DRIVERS OF INSECURITY   
If we were only interested in a backward looking analysis, the pattern of scores over time 
would be sufficient to indicate trends in human security. But if the assessment has to be 
forward looking and give us early warning of significant changes, we need to combine a 
scoring approach with an analysis of possible drivers that could indicate if some changes are 
more significant than others for future trends.  
 
An important component of our assessment (outlined in Figure 2) is therefore an analysis of 
the drivers of human insecurity in different categories to corroborate whether the direction of 
change observed in levels of security correlates with changes in different drivers that may be 
causing the change. This not only to helps to corroborate our data on level changes, it also 
allows us to assess the significance of the change observed.  
 
The levels of human security in any category will fluctuate from year to year for different 
reasons. Apart from errors of measurement and random fluctuations, any observation over 
time is typically a product of long term trends and cyclical movements around that trend. 
Cyclical fluctuations can be an important source of year to year variations in human security, 
and an analysis of drivers is particularly important for distinguishing between cyclical 
fluctuations and more significant changes in trends.  
 
Cyclical fluctuations are likely to be related to cycles in a number of underlying drivers of 
insecurity. For instance, cycles of human insecurity can be related to political/electoral 
cycles, which can result in an upsurge of some types of insecurity in the run-up to elections or 
other cyclical political phenomena, or economic cycles, which can exacerbate conflicts 
driven by scarcity. To complicate the story, the frequency and amplitude of cyclical 















: Change in level could be a 
cyclical deterioration around an unbroken 
positive trend (unbroken lines) the beginning 
of a new negative trend (broken lines)
Observation 3: Significant 
break in trend can only now 
be observed
 
Figure 3 Human Security: Levels, Trends and Cycles 
 
Figure 3 shows what is at issue in graphical form for a hypothetical category of human 
security. The unbroken lines show the trend and cycles we expect on the basis of past 
observations of human security scores. We begin with observation 1 which shows a situation 
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where human security is satisfactory and improving. This observation is consistent with the 
historically observed patterns of trends and cycles shown by the trend and cycle lines in 
Figure 3. However, we then have observation 2, where we observe a deterioration of human 
security in this category.  
 
Despite the deterioration, observation 2 could still be consistent with the pattern of cyclical 
fluctuations associated with the historical trend. If so, even though human security has 
deteriorated, it is not yet a cause for long-term concern as the trend could still be positive, 
though we could be concerned about the drivers of the cyclical fluctuations. However, the 
same deterioration could also indicate the beginning of a new negative trend, shown by the 
broken trend line and new cycles around a worsening trend. Observation 2 on its own does 
not allow us to discriminate between these two possibilities, but a forward-looking 
assessment should warn us if the second possibility was likely.  
 
If we rely only on observations, we will not know if there has been a significant break in the 
trend till observation 3. A parallel analysis of drivers of human insecurity and how they are 
changing can complement the scoring part of the assessment exercise and warn us as early as 
observation 2 that the human security situation may be structurally changing. This would be 
the case if the deterioration picked up in observation 2 was associated with changes in drivers 
that suggest a structural shift rather than simply cyclical fluctuations. The discussion of 
drivers therefore plays a significant role in a forward-looking assessment exercise.  
 
Ideally, the analysis of drivers should i) help to corroborate changes in levels observed in the 
scoring exercise, and ii) help to give advance warning of trend shifts and changes in patterns 
of cycles. In an initial or early assessment such as this one, when historic patterns based on 
past scores cannot be identified, the analysis of drivers can play a particularly important role 
in making sense of any changes in levels observed over the recent past. In our case, an 
analysis of drivers is particularly important because of the limitations in the available data 
and evidence (discussed in Box 2), which meant that we could at best identify directions of 
change for some categories of insecurity. As a result, we relied heavily on our analysis of 
drivers to assess the significance of changes that appear to have taken place in 2005.  
 
The subsequent section looks at our six categories in turn, discussing the crude available 
evidence, the likely drivers of human insecurity in each category and the likely significance 
of the observed data given these drivers. Each category discussion will therefore combine the 
second and third components of our assessment methodology (Figure 2). In contrast to the 
dearth of hard data and evidence on human insecurity, our identification of possible drivers 
for our categories of human security can draw on a rich analytical literature on the causes of 
different types of human insecurity in developing countries including Bangladesh.  
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5. ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN SECURITY CATEGORIES  
This section looks in turn at the six categories of human security identified for assessment. 
Each category is dealt in four sub-sections. In sub-section 1, we examine the available 
evidence and derive any conclusions about recent trends that are warranted on the basis of the 
limited available evidence. In sub-section 2 we identify the most important drivers of human 
security in that category on the basis of available empirical and theoretical work in 
Bangladesh and elsewhere. In sub-section 3 we examine the correspondence between changes 
in the drivers identified and recent trends to derive the best possible conclusions about 
whether the observed changes are due to cyclical variations or more fundamental changes in 
trends. Finally, in sub-section 4 the discussion of each category ends with a discussion of 
possible policy responses to the levels and changes observed in that category. This structure 
is followed for all six categories, but the first category of insecurity resulting from 
characteristics of politics and the political system is the subject of a long discussion as this is 
both the most entrenched source of human insecurity in Bangladesh as well as having drivers 
that feed into almost all the other categories of insecurity. 
 
A.  HUMAN INSECURITY RESULTING FROM CHARACTERISTICS OF 
POLITICS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.  
 
Politics and the political system in Bangladesh are directly and indirectly responsible for 
many aspects of human insecurity. The regular violations of the rights of persons and 
property (that are often formally protected in law) are very often the direct result of violence 
or expropriation carried out through the political process. These violations are not associated 
with particular parties as they happen irrespective of the party in power. In this section, we 
focus on the direct effects of politics and the political system. However, the drivers of this 
category of insecurity have important crosscutting effects on almost all of our other 
categories. For instance, the instability of property rights, the violence and insecurity related 
to land and asset grabbing, many of the insecurities caused by the interventions and failures 
of the administrative and judicial systems, and many of the attacks on the land and assets of 
vulnerable groups including religious and ethnic minorities are related to the accumulation 
strategies of political factions. These aspects of insecurity will be separately looked at in 
other categories. 
 
A-1) AVAILABLE EVIDENCE 
The available evidence on recent changes has some contradictory aspects but the overall 
direction is a general deterioration in many aspects of security connected with politics in 
2005. The deterioration could be a cyclical one related to the electoral cycle, with elections 
approaching and the opposition gearing up in 2005 to challenge the appointment of the 
proposed head of the interim government and the Chief Election Commissioner. Our analysis 
of the drivers of patron-client competition suggests that this cyclical decline promises to be 
much worse than the ‘normal’ violence of pre-election patron-client politics in Bangladesh 
and may trigger a serious and sustained deterioration. 
 
Only a limited number of sub-categories were covered by the available data for 2005, mostly 
focused on deaths and injuries due to political conflicts, mostly of political activists. Given 
the range of variation in the absolute numbers reported, we will only report directions of 
change and percentages. But note that even percentages do not mean very much, given the 
weaknesses in the data (see Box 2). The focus should only be on the directions of change 
indicated, and that also with some caution.  
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Within this category of human security, there were improvements in human security in two 
sub-categories and deterioration in five sub-categories. These sub-categories are not 
necessarily the most appropriate ones, but are the ones for which data is available. 
 
a) Deaths resulting from political conflicts. The sub-category of deaths due to political 
conflicts overlaps with many other categories of insecurity in a patron-client polity. The 
political system is marked by intense and violent political conflicts between parties and 
between factions within parties. But political factions are also frequently mobilized to 
‘resolve’ many personal conflicts over land and resources. As a result, some violent deaths 
primarily to do with personal conflicts between individuals are often categorized as being due 
to political conflicts. In a polity dominated by patron-client factions, it is often impossible to 
distinguish personal from political conflicts and we should expect some double counting in 
deaths in this category and deaths in other categories (such as land related conflicts).  
 
Comparing 2005 with 2004, reported deaths resulting from political conflicts declined. (The 
reported decline was between 48% and 41% based on two sources, Appendix B Table A.1). 
However, the level of insecurity remained high because amongst the dead were a number of 
prominent politicians in both years. They included in 2004 the opposition (Awami League) 
MP Ahsanullah Master, an attempt on the life of opposition leader Sheikh Hasina killed 23 
people, and in 2005 the former AL minister Shah AMS Kibria was killed in a bomb attack. 
University teachers have also frequently been targets.  
 
b) Arbitrary arrests. Arbitrary arrests are defined as arrests without warrant under Section 
54 of the criminal code. Arbitrary and sometimes mass arrests of opposition party activists 
are often organized to harass or to disrupt planned agitations. Many ordinary citizens are also 
sometimes picked up and harassed in these sweeps.  
 
Comparing 2005 with 2004, reported arbitrary arrests declined. (The reported decline was 
58% in a single source, Appendix B Table A.4). All these arrests are not necessarily 
politically motivated as they include preventive detention of suspected criminals. 
 
c) Injuries in political conflicts. Injuries in political conflicts are also not well-defined in a 
patron-client polity. Many violent conflicts that involve political factions are often primarily 
personal resource conflicts where political factions are mobilized. Once again, some degree 
of double counting with other categories of insecurity is unavoidable in these cases.  
 
Comparing 2005 with 2004, reported injuries in all types of political conflicts increased. 
(The reported increase was between 19% and 44% based on two sources, Appendix B Table 
A.2 and A.3). It is noteworthy that of the total numbers reported injured in party conflicts in 
2005, 57% were injured in conflicts between parties, but as many as 24% were injured in 
conflicts within parties, mostly within the ruling BNP. This observation is important for 
understanding the nature of patron-client politics and for assessing the significance of 
political changes happening in 2005, to which we will return later. The rest of the injuries 
were of party workers of all parties injured in clashes with police.  
 
However, injuries in one particular type of political activity declined. Reported injuries 
during hartals fell in 2005 compared to 2004, even though the number of hartals (see below) 




d) Abductions. The data does not discriminate between political abductions and criminal 
abductions for ransom. Often it is difficult to distinguish between the two as the abductors 
involved and sometimes the abducted may have both a political and/or a criminal identity. 
Political leaders or their family members are often targeted by rival gangs.  
 
Comparing 2005 with 2004, reported abductions increased. (The reported increase was 
232% according to a single source, Appendix B Table A.4). 
 
e) Hartals. Frequent political disruptions of economic and civic life, particularly in urban 
centres have become common. The traditional hartal has now been added to by other variants 
such as the oborodh or blockade that isolates urban centres. Compared to ‘normal’ levels of 
disruption and violence, 2005 (and 2006) were particularly bad years as the leading parties 
failed to agree on the composition of the upcoming interim government due to take over at 
the end of 2006 to organize elections early in 2007. (This crisis became more entrenched in 
the course of 2006.)  
 
Compared to 16 hartals in 2004, the number increased to 21 in 2005. Reported deaths during 
hartals increased from a reported figure of 0 in 2004 to either 4 or 2 in 2005 depending on 
the source (two sources Appendix B Table A.5). Unlike some of the other evidence based on 
newspaper reports with the problems discussed earlier (see Box 2), the evidence on the 
increase in numbers of hartals is clear cut as these are actual numbers not samples.  
 
f) Bomb Blasts. In addition to the intensification of ‘normal’ political violence there was a 
worrying upsurge of bomb blasts in 2005, including coordinated attacks in August 2005 
organized by an extremist Islamic group, the JMB. Attacks by this group declined in 2006 as 
the government took firm action, but the question remains whether the bomb blasts were a 
random aberration or a manifestation of structural drivers that are likely to drive further 
extremist violence in the near future. 
 
Compared to 2004, reported incidents of bomb blasts in 2005 increased. (The reported 
increase was more than 12 times, single source, Appendix B Table A.7). Injuries in bomb 
blasts increased 29% and deaths increased 74% to 60. While the precise number of bomb 
blasts recorded may have missed some blasts, once again, this evidence is relatively hard as 
the figures cover a large proportion of the total. There is little doubt that 2005 witnessed a 
spike in bomb blasts compared to the previous year.  
 
g) Opposition absence in parliament. This is a measure of the normalization of extra-
parliamentary political contests, often violent. In 2005, the two major political parties were 
locked in political combat, but not in parliament, where the opposition made no appearance.  
 
Compared to 2004, when the opposition was absent for 47 out of 83 days, absence in 2005 
increased to 62 out of 62 days of parliamentary operation (Appendix B Table A.9). This too 
is hard evidence on the actual number of days in parliament, unlike other figures based on 
newspaper sampling.  
 
h) Attacks on journalists. Available figures do not distinguish between attacks that are 
genuinely political attacks on free speech and attacks where journalists are themselves 
involved in factional affiliations and conflicts. Attacks on journalists can therefore involve 
some double counting with the broader category of violence in political conflicts. Comparing 
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2005 with 2004 we find inconclusive trends. Available sources give contrary directions of 
change for most types of insecurity affecting journalists (four sources Appendix B Table 
A.6). Violent deaths of journalists appear to have declined, injuries and assaults are up in 
some sources and down in others.   
 
Combining the different types of data and evidence available to us, and keeping in mind that 
some of this data is hard data, different from the newspaper data that is far less trustworthy, 
we can conclude with some confidence that 2005 witnessed a decline in political stability and 
a worsening of human security associated with the operation of politics and the political 
system.  
 
Critical areas where information is lacking. 
Data and evidence are almost entirely lacking in a number of critical sub-categories:  
 
i) Economic effects of political insecurity on different income classes. The World Bank 
estimates that Bangladesh lost around 5% of its annual GDP in the 1990s due to hartals, and 
the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) report that its 
members lose US$18 million per day of hartal (Category Report A: 11). The UNDP 
estimates a lower figure of around 3-4% of GDP lost based on extrapolating the number of 
days lost as a proportion of a productive year (UNDP 2005: 32-3). However, these figures are 
likely to vary year-to-year as the UNDP also points out that different groups are continuously 
evolving coping strategies to deal with hartals. But we do not know how effectively 
vulnerable groups have coped with recent hartals. Moreover, while we have some tentative 
figures for hartals, we do not have any estimates for the economic losses due to other types 
of political insecurity. The list here is very large and includes the collection of tolls or chanda 
from different sectors and economic classes, the effects of political rent-collection on 
different types of service delivery, and so on. No estimates exist on the magnitude or 
direction of change of these costs. 
 
ii) Risks of violence and insecurity faced by non-political actors. The bulk of the available 
data and evidence refers to the insecurity faced by political activists, though some figures for 
deaths and injuries may include unknown numbers of passers-by or innocent individuals 
caught up in political fights. But most deaths and injuries of non-political actors may have 
been missed in newspaper reports because the latter focus on high-profile conflicts and give 
less systematic attention to the routine violence and insecurity inflicted on ordinary citizens 
by the political process.  
 
The political process involves the extraction of resources by political actors to finance 
political activities, or for pure predation. Parties rely heavily on local strongmen called 
mastans and compete with each other to incorporate the most powerful mastans within their 
own parties. Political ‘fund-raising’ frequently involves threats against those who are less 
than eager to pay. We have no figures that allow us to assess directions of change in the 
extent and intensity of insecurity faced by victims. Other victims of political activity include 
school and university students, whose studies are grievously affected by the whims of those 
who call hartals and oborodhs.   
 
The overall picture in this category on the basis of the limited data available is one of 
sustained high levels of insecurity, with worsening conditions in 2005 in terms of injuries due 
to an intensification of conflicts, a spike in bomb blasts, greater political strife between the 
major parties and a total breakdown of the parliamentary part of democracy. How significant 
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are these changes? Do they represent the normal cyclical deterioration Bangladesh has come 
to expect in the run-up to elections, or are there more serious underlying drivers that should 
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political competition, we need to understand the drivers of patron-client politics and 




political leadership (weak 




of ‘clients’ on ‘patrons’ 








Excess supply of 
intermediate class 
organizers seeking upward 
mobility through political 
‘accumulation’







Fragmentation of ruling coalitions over time
Improved productive employment and accumulation 
strategies for intermediate classes
Insecurity exacerbated by:
Attempts by any faction to monopolize power
Reduction of employment and accumulation opportunities 
for intermediate classes
Clientelist systems ca
or instability, and in t
changes in these lev
politics. As these are






power and not in the
level of accountabilit
 Figure 4 Drivers of politically driven human insecurityn operate with substantial differences in the degree of political stability 
he extent of the associated human insecurity. To be able to predict likely 
els, we need an analysis of the drivers and effects of patron-client 
 also drivers of insecurity in almost all of our other categories, more 
hese drivers is warranted. 
lity of Political Leadership. The most common explanation for the 
-client politics in countries like Bangladesh focuses on the obvious fact 
litics operates in the interests of the factions competing for political 
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few instead of the many. The question really is why. The standard arguments are that low 
accountability is due to weak institutions of democracy and excessive centralization 
(Eisenstadt 1973; Médard 2002), traditional cultures of deference or deep social divisions that 
prevent collective action, for instance due to ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Barbone, et al. 
2006). While the description of limited accountability in patron-client polities is a fact, the 
standard explanations of low accountability do not answer some important questions.  
 
First, these drivers of patron-client politics provide a weak explanation for the prevalence of 
patron-client politics when examined in depth. While accountability in patron-client polities 
is low in a general sense (politics does not serve the public interest), this does not mean there 
is low accountability of political leaders. Faction leaders in countries like Bangladesh do not 
maintain themselves in power entirely or even largely through force (even though the rotation 
of factions in power can involve considerable violence between factions). Normally, leaders 
respond and deliver to powerful and important constituencies within their parties, and outside 
their parties in the country beyond. These constituencies are huge in absolute numbers. To 
that extent, there is already substantial accountability of leaders, not to society as a whole, 
but to the organizationally powerful groups who matter.  
 
As soon as we recognize this fact, many of the explanations of low accountability appear 
deficient, because they assume that patron-client politics exists because leaders are in general 
unaccountable. For instance, deepening the institutions of democracy or local government 
will only reduce the incidence of patron-client politics if the problem in the first instance was 
due to a general unaccountability of leaders. But if leaders are already accountable to 
organizationally powerful constituencies, greater democracy and decentralization may in 
many cases simply reinforce the hold of these groups on the political process. Indeed, this is 
what we find in many developing countries, including Bangladesh, where more than a decade 
of democratization and decentralization has had little effect on the overall incidence of 
patron-client politics. This observation should warn us not to expect accountability in the 
general sense to improve if further feasible moves in the direction of deepening 
democratization and decentralization are achieved. 
 
Similarly, there is little evidence that patron-client politics in Bangladesh or in other 
developing countries is based on a cultural deference to traditional elites. Rather, the 
relationship between patrons and clients is a very ‘modern’ one, where clients offer their 
support to patrons only to the extent that they receive appropriate payoffs. Nor is the general 
accountability of leaders low because of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. This might 
exacerbate problems in some countries, but Bangladesh is a good example of persistent 
patron-client politics in a relatively homogenous nation-state.  
 
But secondly, we observe no changes in the degree of accountability of the political 
leadership in Bangladesh that could explain the intensification of insecurity due to political 
competition between patron-client factions in 2005.  
 
ii) The Economic Dependence of the Poor. An alternative explanation focuses on economic 
inequalities that force a large class of poor people to depend on patrons for their survival, and 
this in turn allows personalized power to be exercised by patrons (Engerman and Sokoloff 
2002). We will argue that economic underdevelopment creates strong drivers for patron-
client politics, but mainly because underdevelopment makes patron-client accumulation 
strategies the most rational ones for political entrepreneurs from the intermediate classes. The 
most important clients that patrons mobilize in pursuit of their accumulation strategies are 
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also primarily from the intermediate classes and are not the very poor, though the latter may 
be occasionally mobilized for some types of confrontations. The most critical clients 
organized by patrons in political conflicts (in hartals or the organization of electoral 
conflicts) are not the very poor but come from the intermediate classes (even though they too 
are often poor in absolute terms).  
 
Intermediate class clients do not follow their patrons because of their economic dependence 
on them but rather because factional politics offers the most lucrative accumulation strategies 
for both patrons and clients. In this sense, social inequalities and the existence of the poor are 
not the main drivers of patron-client politics, though the availability of poor people who can 
occasionally be easily mobilized obviously helps political organizers. The dominant causal 
relationship is probably in the opposite direction, whereby the accumulation strategies 
unleashed by patron-client politics create new social inequalities as successful political 
entrepreneurs engage in primitive accumulation that can make the more successful organizers 
very rich in a short space of time.  
 
An important implication is that we should not expect feasible reductions in the absolute 
poverty of the very poor to have a big impact on the intensity of patron-client competition. 
This competition is mainly led and organized by the intermediate classes. Only a 
redistributive strategy that targeted the intermediate classes is likely to reduce the intensity of 
competition within these classes and thereby have a significant effect on the intensity and 
violence of political conflict.  
 
iii) Limited Fiscal Resources for Accommodating Intermediate Class Demands. An 
important factor that helps to explain the ubiquity of patron-client political organization in 
developing countries is that developing countries (like advanced ones) have large groups of 
well-organized and powerful individuals who demand redistribution, but (unlike advanced 
countries) they lack the fiscal resources that could be used to achieve political stability and 
integration through transparent fiscal redistributions to these groups.  
 
Advanced countries tax between 35-50% of very large GDPs and are able to provide services 
and transfers that amount to significant internal redistribution. While the poor benefit from 
some of these transfers, public spending also satisfies the non-poor constituencies who have 
disproportionate political power in all countries. This is the most important reason why 
politically powerful constituencies in rich countries organize themselves around different 
positions on how to spend the national budget.  
 
In contrast, developing countries can tax barely 10-25% of much smaller GDPs, Bangladesh 
being in the middle of this range. After paying the salaries of bureaucrats, most developing 
countries have very little left over for public goods and infrastructure, let alone for significant 
transfers to politically powerful groups. It is not surprising that politics in developing 
countries rarely focuses on the budget and indeed, much of politics happens outside 
parliament. The politically powerful satisfy their demands for redistribution through other 
processes, and factional organization in patron-client networks is the result.  
 
The politically powerful in Bangladesh come from a range of ‘intermediate classes’ who 
collectively constitute around 30% of the population. Their incomes are on average lower 
than those of the tiny ‘capitalist’ elite who have enough capital to earn significant returns on 
their assets, and the poor who have to work for their living. The intermediate classes have 
some education and some capital, but for enterprising individuals from these classes, upward 
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mobility involves ‘political accumulation’ based on their political and organizational power 
(Khan 2000, 2005).  
 
Political accumulation involves using their organizational muscle to make money in a variety 
of ways, including capturing government contracts with large margins, collecting protection 
money, organizing social groups including the poor for redistributive demands and capturing 
payoffs from the state or private enterprise as ‘mediators’ of these conflicts, appropriating 
public and private assets that are insufficiently protected, and so on. The more notorious 
political entrepreneurs describe themselves as mastans, but the latter are variants within a 
wide range of organizers who differ only in terms of the level of violence they use, their 
social respectability and the social level they operate at. Many successful businessmen and 
politicians at the highest levels of Bangladeshi society began their careers as political 
accumulators of different types, and some began their lives as mastans. A brief examination 
of their life histories shows that many political accumulators do succeed in achieving rapid 
upward mobility and social acceptability.  
 
Once we recognize the importance of political accumulation strategies, we find that 
significant changes occurred in 2005 that upset the expectations of factions excluded from 
political power and this could explain the intensification of political contestation that year. 
 
iv) Excess Supply of Potential Intermediate Class Organizers. Exacerbating the problem 
of limited fiscal resources are the growing demands coming from rapidly expanding 
intermediate classes. The intermediate classes in developing countries are typically growing 
faster than the demographic growth rate because of the spread of education and the upward 
mobility of poorer social groups who in turn demand rapid upward mobility. The annual 
graduates of schools, colleges and universities are far more numerous than the local 
productive economy can absorb, as witnessed by the numbers attempting to emigrate every 
year. The growing group of individuals with organizational abilities who are not able to find 
or create productive positions or achieve fiscal redistribution are the raw material for patron-
client faction building and political competition. This is not just a Bangladeshi problem, but 
one that affects most developing countries. The emergence of ever new caste groupings in 
India as new groups assert their aspiration for upward mobility is a manifestation of this 
trend. However, the types of patron-client organizations and their strategies of accumulation 
can and do differ significantly across countries. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF PATRON-CLIENT POLITICS FOR HUMAN SECURITY. A 
political system dominated by patron-client politics will have direct effects on human security 
through off-budget resource capture, the capture of public resources and other political 
accumulation strategies. Apart from the human insecurity these accumulation processes 
unleash, the competition between and within factions as they seek to capture political power 
is a further cause of human insecurity. Many of the aspects of human insecurity in the form of 
political violence, abductions, arbitrary arrests and hartals follow directly from the zero-sum 
calculations of factional competition rather than positive-sum economic development 
strategies (Figure 4).  
  
Political parties in the context of clientelist politics are best understood as pyramidal 
aggregations of factions. Despite their apparently serious ideological differences, clientelist 
parties share a common logic of competing to absorb the most effective sub-factions and 
attempting to dislocate incumbent coalitions from their positions of power. As a result, at all 
levels of politics in Bangladesh, and particularly at the middle and lower levels, we find an 
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impressive fluidity of loyalties and frequent changes in affiliations that belie the strident 
ideological differences that are often claimed.  
 
The excess demand for resources and the fact that only a minority of potential organizers can 
be incorporated into lucrative positions of political accumulation at any one time means that 
the pyramidal factions enjoying power are inherently unstable. Political stability at the 
societal level (to the limited extent that it is achieved) depends on smooth transitions of 
power between factions, and factions accepting that their time in the sun is limited and they 
will periodically have to regroup and return.  
 
THE ‘NORMAL’ FUNCTIONING OF PATRON-CLIENT POLITICS: FACTIONAL 
CYCLING AND MODERATE STABILITY. 
The dominance of patron-client politics does not mean that human security cannot be assured 
at all. The ‘normal’ operation of patron-client politics has stabilizing factors that can keep 
insecurity at moderate levels. But upsetting these conditions can have serious consequences.  
 
If enough powerful factions and their leaders are accommodated and the excluded have a 
reasonable probability of replacing them in the near future, the system can achieve moderate 
levels of security and stability. We would expect such a system to have moderate levels of 
political insecurity, but with cycles of insecurity corresponding to electoral cycles as 
excluded factions increase their activity to oust incumbents through electoral contests. But 
political stability can suddenly collapse if excluded groups feel that their chances of reaching 
positions of power in a reasonable time frame are being blocked. This is why we can have 
sudden and disproportionate spikes in political violence if expectations are tampered with.  
 
The ‘normal’ operation of patron-client politics results in a cycling of factions and this has a 
restraining role on political insecurity through a number of mechanisms.  
 
i) Natural Life Cycle of Ruling Coalitions. The normal internal dynamics of the ruling and 
opposition parties puts a limit on how long a ruling coalition can stay in power. The longer 
the ruling party has been in power, the greater the number of internal discontents who feel 
they have not been adequately rewarded for their support. Defections normally increase, 
together with the setting up of new parties and coalitions by disgruntled members of the 
ruling coalition. At the same time as the ruling patron-client coalition is losing key faction 
leaders, the coalition of excluded factions gets more united as its members are increasingly 
hungry for power, often joined by defectors from the ruling party, and they are increasingly 
focused about how to end their continued exclusion from lucrative opportunities.  
 
ii) Voting as a Disciplining Mechanism. Voters can and do use elections to discipline 
incumbents when levels of expropriation exceed tolerable bounds and this can also limit 
political accumulation. Although elections do not necessarily translate voter preferences into 
policies, they do work as a disciplining mechanism, and this is why there is often a strong 
anti-incumbency vote in countries like Bangladesh. This is usually not because most voters 
care about the programmes of competing parties (that are in any case very similar), but rather 
because their only way of limiting the damage done by ruling factions is to occasionally 
‘teach them a lesson’ even though in the long run, the new faction will be no better.  
 
In passing, an analysis of patron-client politics can also explain why the hopes that ‘honest 
politicians’ may be able to break this mould are unlikely to be realized. The numbers of 
organizationally powerful political entrepreneurs who belong to competing factions and the 
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resources that are circulated within these factions are very significant, and a completely 
honest politician has very little chance of competing with the mobilizing capacity of 
‘mainstream’ factions and their capacity to deliver off-budget resources to critical 
constituencies. This is why, unfortunately, cycling between effective (and therefore 
extractive) patron-client factions is often the only realistic way for individual voters to 
exercise some discipline over their political masters. It also explains why a genuinely honest 
politician (as opposed to one using the rhetoric of honesty to discredit their opponents) is so 
hard to find. Such politicians do occasionally emerge, and are sometimes elected, but an 
understanding of the structural drivers of patron-client politics helps to explain why these 
events are so very rare. 
 
iii) Live and Let Live. The ‘natural’ cycling of factions is paradoxically a potential 
stabilizing factor for human security as each faction knows that other factions will eventually 
come to power for a while. This constrains factions from carrying out too many excesses as 
they know that some of their victims may one day ally with competing factions and exact 
revenge. However, if the faction in power believes that the new regime will expropriate their 
accumulation even if they limit their accumulation to tolerable levels, this can lead to more 
intense predatory outcomes and capital flight to overseas safe havens. However, if regular 
cycling is the expectation, then live and let live strategies can emerge and are potentially 
stabilizing in a patron-client political context. 
 
CONSTRAINING AND EXACERBATING CHANGES IN DRIVERS 
This combination of internal checks and balances can ensure that despite the absence of 
‘good governance’ there are limits to the degree of insecurity and predation. In the best case 
scenario, regular cycling and effective electoral disciplining may reduce insecurity to ‘low’ 
enough levels to allow a semblance of normality in social life, and to allow moderate to high 
rates of economic growth (Figure 4). Indeed some of the primitive accumulation by political 
accumulators can also eventually contribute to productive outcomes with the gradual 
emergence of a productive capitalist class. In contrast, attempts by any faction to monopolize 
power by changing the rules of the game can result in a disproportionate spiking of violence. 
The descent into instability in Bangladesh during the course of 2005 is very likely linked to 
such an attempt by a faction within the then ruling party.  
 
Of course, developing countries are not doomed to live with patron-client politics forever. If 
economic growth continues, tax takes can increase over time, and the conditions for the 
emergence of a viable social democracy can eventually emerge. However, if this normal 
cycling is interrupted as a result of attempts by some factions to monopolize power, the 
results can rapidly be very destabilizing. 
 
Islamist Extremism: An Additional Source of Human Insecurity? A further worry from 
2005 onwards was the prospect of an upsurge in Islamist violence. The spike in bomb blasts 
in 2005 raised the prospect of an Islamist insurgency in Bangladesh. However, we now know 
that in 2006, harsh action by the government against the main suspect group, the JMB, 
resulted in a number of key arrests and a sharp decline in the number of bomb blasts 
emanating from this source. What is the likely risk that the JMB may be a manifestation of 
deeper drivers that may re-emerge in the future? 
 
As in many other Muslim countries, there has been a gradual increase in overt religiosity in 
Bangladesh over the last decade, for instance with many more middle class women wearing 
headscarves. But this should not be confused with the potential of violence. Lower down the 
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income scale, poor education contributes to obscurantism and prejudice that can sometimes 
take a religious character, but this too is not a sufficient driver of radical political Islam, as 
these conditions have existed for many years in the past. 
 
At the political level, the Jamaat is the only major party that has an ideological following, 
meaning that many of its middle class members belong to it because they share its political, 
cultural and educational objectives rather than for standard patron-client calculations. 
However, while the Jamaat has a conservative educational and cultural agenda that many 
secular people find worrying, its popular support is relatively small.  
 
The BNP with which it was in alliance in government in 2005 is a clientelist party and the 
threat this alliance poses in terms of extremism becoming more pronounced is probably 
exaggerated. There are dangers from a secular perspective of greater social conservatism that 
may be emerging from Jamaat’s educational and cultural agenda, but it is important not to 
confuse this with an immediate threat of radical extremism that we see in some other Muslim 
countries.  
 
The JMB incident appears to have been more closely connected to the normal machinations 
of factional politics where ruling and opposition coalitions can mobilize different sources of 
violence potential to further their own factional goals. Ruling coalitions frequently use 
powerful local factions to control other even more problematic factions. There is some 
evidence that the JMB performed this role for the ruling coalition, and initially assisted in 
controlling more troublesome freebooters in some parts of North Bengal. Their subsequent 
actions suggest links with more extremist ideologies although its leadership does not yet 
display the type of ideological commitment observed in other Muslim countries.  
 
There is a real possibility that in the current global climate, otherwise ordinary client factions 
may try to identify with ideologies that are now perceived as dangerous in order to increase 
the ‘price’ they expect to exact for their collaboration with ruling factions. In these cases, the 
best response of ruling coalitions would be to treat these factions as any other, and resist 
falling into the trap of taking their declared identity too seriously.  
 
The external danger is perhaps more serious, that networks external to Bangladesh may use 
these self-declared extremists to pursue agendas of disruption for their own ends. This danger 
is difficult to assess at the moment, but there are at least some factors that make this less 
likely as an immediate threat. Going against the grain of the dominant clientelist politics of 
Bangladesh requires not only an ideologically committed core of supporters but a core 
willing to accept very substantial dangers as they will directly threaten the way of life of 
powerful clientelist mainstream parties. It is very unlikely that the professionals and small 
business people who provide Jamaat with its ideological membership have any desire to 
challenge mainstream politics in this way, at least in the near future.  
 
Bangladesh is different from Muslim countries like Egypt or even Pakistan where there is a 
wide social gap between the political and business elites and the intermediate classes. When a 
very significant gap emerges, large numbers of the intermediate classes find their path of 
upward mobility through political accumulation permanently blocked. It then becomes 
possible for broad sections of the intermediate classes in these countries to want to radically 
change a system that no longer works for them.  
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In contrast, Bangladeshi elites have recently emerged from a relatively undifferentiated 
peasant society and elites are still emerging from the intermediate classes using processes of 
political accumulation and patron-client politics. Many of Bangladesh’s elites are not yet very 
far away socially or culturally from the clients they mobilize within patron-client networks. 
In turn, most politically powerful organizers from the intermediate classes appear to be 
committed to ‘normal’ patron-client political accumulation, which still gives most of them a 
chance of rapid upward mobility. These factors imply that the pool of seriously alienated 
intermediate class activists who could provide recruits and organizers for sustained 
radicalism is still relatively small in Bangladesh, though this may not remain true forever. It 
also explains why the government was able to take decisive action against the JMB with 
virtually no social opposition from the political classes when it became clear that the JMB’s 
adventurism was costing the ruling coalition too much.  
 
A-3) TRENDS AND CYCLICAL VARIATIONS 
In this section we compare some of the evidence of changes in drivers with our assessment of 
the direction of change in levels of human security in this category. Some of our evidence on 
growing political violence in 2005, including intra-party violence within the ruling BNP 
coincided with the emergence of a constitutional crisis over the composition of the interim 
government charged with organizing the coming elections. The intense conflicts within the 
BNP also suggest that some factions within the party were attempting to monopolize 
lucrative positions at the expense of others. These facts suggest a change in some of the 
conditions required for an orderly cycling of factions and can explain why relatively minor 
factors triggered a significant intensification of conflict and a worsening of human security 
beyond the normal cyclical deterioration associated with elections. These internal changes in 
the operation of patron-client cycling are likely to be the most significant explanation for the 
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downturn. However, our analysis of the ‘normal’ operation of patron-client politics warns us 
that the deterioration in political insecurity that began in 2005 and that took the form of a 
serious constitutional crisis in 2006 is likely to be significantly worse than the normal cycle.  
  
The possibility of Islamist extremism has also clearly emerged but the threat of escalation is 
probably not an immediate one. The spike in insecurity caused by the blasts attributed to the 
JMB may prove to be a one-off event rather than the precursor of a new trend, but this will 
need to be reassessed in the future. Clearly, in the new global situation Bangladesh is likely to 
be a target for international Islamist networks. This is a possible source of a future upsurge in 
insecurity in this area, more than any strong internal drivers supporting Islamist extremism. 
The organization of clientelist factions and the incorporation of large elements of the 
intermediate classes in clientelist politics paradoxically contribute to a relative degree of 
security on this score as radical changes do not seem to be supported by most socially 
powerful political organizers. However, this should not be taken for granted, and a significant 
disaffection of a large core of intermediate class political organizers could present an 
opportunity for extremist ideologies.  
 
A-4) POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Policy responses to politically driven insecurity need to address the immediate drivers as well 
as the effects, particularly for poor and vulnerable groups, and perhaps some of the long-term 
drivers that can cause or exacerbate this insecurity. In addition, the political process results in 
insecurity through a number of indirect mechanisms that will be discussed in later sections 
dealing with other categories of human insecurity where the political process is indirectly 
implicated. Possible responses are discussed in the appropriate sections.  
 
i) Obstacles to factional cycling are primarily political. Unfortunately for donors, and for 
Bangladeshi civil society looking for quick solutions, the major drivers of long-term political 
instability in Bangladesh and the drivers of the steep worsening that began in 2005 are 
political and not institutional. The immediate drivers of the precipitate decline in political 
stability were political strategies of a faction within the ruling BNP (in power in 2005) that 
upset the expectation of factional cycling. Creating the appropriate conditions for moderate 
stability in a patron-client polity is difficult because much depends on the balance of power 
between factions. Stability requires a balance of power that prevents any faction attempting 
monopolization. If a ruling coalition or a faction within it begins to believe it can 
permanently exclude others, this is likely to be the beginning of an intense contestation 
because in fact other factions in Bangladesh are not that weak.  
 
One implication is that Bangladesh’s unique interim government system for conducting 
elections is an inadequate protection without the recognition by all factions that attempts at 
monopolization are unlikely to work. But if this recognition emerges, the need for special 
institutional arrangements becomes far less compelling. In India, where competing factions 
understand (at least most of the time) that monopolization is not a viable strategy, electoral 
cycling takes place without any special constitutional arrangements like Bangladesh’s interim 
government (though at the level of state politics, federal intervention is often required to 
overcome occasional crises). A better understanding of these issues may save us searching for 
institutional cures for a fundamentally political problem.  
 
In a context where ‘normal’ politics is based on patron-client factions and the use of 
patronage and power for political accumulation, the search for an institutional guarantee of a 
‘fair election’ is not a simple one. All parties use muscle in their everyday political activity, 
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and they will use their muscle during elections. But if the opposition loses, the frustration of 
factions that are excluded over two electoral cycles is likely to create more than average 
instability. The instability is likely to be much worse if losing factions expect to be 
permanently excluded. Regardless of the formal economic and social policies of the parties, it 
seems that the only reasonably stable outcome for human security in this system is a regular 
cycling of parties in power, or for the ruling party to successfully incorporate the cycling of 
the most important factions within itself. This means that while stronger electoral institutions 
like election commissions can help, they are unlikely on their own to resolve the problem of 
potentially destabilizing deteriorations of political stability till the balance of power between 
factions prevents any faction attempting to monopolize power for too long.  
 
Unfortunately, all major political parties in Bangladesh have at one time or another attempted 
to monopolize power. The hope is that political lessons will eventually be learnt by the major 
competing factions and ‘live and let live’ strategies will emerge. Only when that happens will 
there be a sustainable context for the viable strengthening of electoral and other institutions 
that can regulate the underlying political consensus.  
 
There is an indirect policy implication of this analysis. Donors should not expect quick wins 
for political stability through strategies of institutional reform like decentralization or 
improving the efficiency of service delivery to the poor. Some institutional reforms are 
desirable for their own sake, and even if they may contribute to political stability, their 
success depends on political balances that are difficult to engineer. Indeed attempts by 
outsiders to engineer these outcomes are likely to be counterproductive. However, the 
number and strength of competing factions in Bangladesh means that it is quite likely that the 
cycling of factions is the normal outcome and that Bangladesh’s political factions will learn 
to live and let live without recourse to excessive violence.  
 
ii) Improvements in pro-poor service delivery are justified on welfare grounds but have 
limited impact on the drivers of politically driven human insecurity. If the primary driver 
of political instability is the competition between factions led by the intermediate classes, 
improvements in pro-poor service delivery are unlikely to have a big impact on political 
stability. Indeed, in Bangladesh the deterioration in political stability during 2005-06 has 
happened in a context of progress towards the MDGs achieved largely through significant 
pro-poor service delivery.  
 
However, if there is a high level of politically driven human insecurity, pro-poor service 
delivery becomes even more important on welfare grounds for mitigating the negative effects 
on the most vulnerable. We expect substantial negative effects of politically driven insecurity 
on the poor through the direct effects of political expropriation, and indirectly through 
disruptions of markets and employment opportunities. The available data do not track the 
economic and security impact of political instability on the poor. For instance, we do not 
know if hartals have more significant effects on the urban poor, on agricultural producers 
whose markets are disrupted, or on the direct victims of violence. Tracking the effects of 
political instability on the poor through surveys will allow targeted responses to be 
developed. 
 
iii) Exaggerating the threat of Islamist radicalism is likely to be counterproductive. 
There is little evidence so far of strong local drivers of Islamist radicalism. As a mainstream 
clientelist party, the BNP government in power in 2005 was probably being truthful in 
strenuously denying that it had a hidden fundamentalist agenda in the political strategies it 
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followed. While Bangladesh is likely to be of interest for international Islamist networks, 
exaggerating the immediate threat is likely to be counterproductive as it may actually 
encourage the emergence of factions asserting their adherence to ‘proscribed’ ideologies and 
international networks as a strategy of extracting a high price for accommodation. If enough 
factions begin to follow these strategies for short term gains, this could end up having serious 
unintended long term effects.  
 
iv) Improvements in economic opportunities for intermediate classes are likely to 
significantly reduce political instability in the long term. The creation of jobs and 
legitimate investment and accumulation opportunities targeted towards the intermediate 
(primarily lower middle) classes, and particularly for young males in these income classes, is 
likely to have a significant impact on political insecurity, and particularly in vulnerable urban 
areas. The creation of jobs for relatively not-so-poor males appears to go against the pro-poor 
policy priorities of donors. But if employment and income improvement opportunities of 
these classes are critical for broader security that affects the poor, a balance has to be found 
between immediate pro-poor priorities and programmes that are likely to have significant 
impacts on everyone’s security in the medium to long run.  
 
For instance, something as trivial as the lack of adequate accommodation for university 
students (in public universities) induces the majority of enterprising and organizationally 
capable students to affiliate with political factions that can use political power to free up 
student accommodation for them. This is a type of off-budget transfer that introduces young 
people to factional politics. These students are then obliged to participate in the broader 
political strategies of competing factions. If the fiscal space allowed the government to 
provide accommodation for all students, this would have a huge impact on political stability 
through direct and indirect mechanisms. Alternatively, we could explore public-private 
partnerships that could provide affordable (that is very cheap) accommodation for students, 
but that too requires fiscal contributions. These are long term issues, but progress in this area 
is likely to have the biggest eventual impact on political stability and security. 
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B.  HUMAN INSECURITY RESULTING FROM CONFLICTS OVER LAND AND 
ASSETS. 
 
Bangladesh is still a largely agricultural country in terms of employment, it is severely land-
poor and the incidence of landlessness is rising. Conflicts over land and assets are very 
widespread and the source of considerable insecurity and violence. 
 
B-1) AVAILABLE EVIDENCE 
There are no data on annual levels of land and property related conflicts and insecurity, and 
none for 2005 that could be compared with earlier years or serve as a benchmark for future 
comparisons. Thus, for this category we could not assess likely level changes. However, 
monitoring human insecurity in this area is important given that insecurity associated with 
access to or ownership of land and assets was identified by many respondents to our 
consultation as an important if not the most important source of human insecurity in terms of 
scale and effects on the poor.  
 
These observations are corroborated by Bangladesh’s poor score on the closely related issue 
of property right stability in assessments of good governance (Kaufmann, et al. 2005). 
However, these indicators only tell us how far away Bangladesh was from the average 
performance (based largely on subjective assessments). As a result, changes in these 
indicators only tell us how the distance away from the average has changed, and not 
necessarily the actual direction of change within Bangladesh over time.  
 
The available data do not allow us to identify either long-term trends or short-term cyclical 
variations in land and asset-related human insecurity with any confidence, but the evidence is 
unequivocal in suggesting high levels of insecurity associated with land and asset conflicts. 
 
i) Rural land grabbing, land-related violence and ‘churning’. Land grabbing by the more 
powerful has always been a feature of rural Bangladesh. This includes grabbing the land not 
only of the relatively weak, but also lands that are public property, including khas land 
earmarked for the poor, publicly owned water bodies and parts of rivers rich in fish. Rural 
land-grabbers often employ gangs of lathials (literally stick-wielding thugs) for this purpose 
and stories occasionally make it to the press of gruesome violence in these conflicts.  
 
Estimates suggest that around a third of all khas land has been illegally appropriated (2 
sources Appendix B Table B.1). This is an aggregate figure and does not allow us to assess 
recent trends, but it suggests significant levels of land grabbing.  
 
Surveys of land holdings show high levels of market and non-market transfers of rural land. 
However, the same data shows that despite significant levels of land and asset grabbing, land 
concentration is not happening because the process of appropriation and loss is continuous 
and affects all classes of landholding (Mahbub Ullah 1996; Khan 2004). The net effect of all 
the land transfers is therefore often described as ‘churning’. This, together with demographic 
growth and the land subdivision that happens when families grow, results in complex 
outcomes. There is a) a growth in landlessness, but also b) a growth in the share of marginal 
and small farms (under 2.5 acres), and c) a decline in the share of medium to large farms 
(over 2.5 and over 7.5 acres) (Appendix B Table B.10).  
 
Thus, Bangladesh appears to have high levels of land grabbing (though we cannot quantify 
the share of land affected or recent trends), but the turmoil does not lead to the emergence of 
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a class of middle to large farmers who could have led a drive into higher productivity 
farming. 
 
ii) Urban primitive accumulation. At the same time, rapid economic development in and 
around urban centres has pushed some land values through the roof with high double digit 
rates of annual price appreciation. This has brought in bigger speculators who deploy political 
power, mastans, and grand corruption to capture land that is rapidly appreciating in value. 
The victims here are often squatters and slum dwellers, but also middle class owners whose 
incomes (to buy protection) are not commensurate with the new values of their land. Much of 
the unplanned development in and around urban centres (that in turn often results in the 
blocking of drainage canals) happens because of these grabs. Non-market transfers that result 
in asset capture by the rich is a form of primitive accumulation. As a result, although hard 
data is not available, the land grabbing processes in these areas are more likely to result in 
land concentration, and are closely connected to the anarchic processes of development in 
urban areas.  
 
There is qualitative evidence of powerful political figures capturing high-value land near 
urban centres. Examples include the capture of tracts of land in areas near Dhaka, such as 
Gazipur, Narayanganj and Ashulia (Category report B, boxes 1-5). Our hunch, which we can 
only assert with limited confidence, based on this type of qualitative evidence is that 
primitive accumulation is increasing in and around urban areas. 
 
iii) Land right are widely contested and protected through informal mechanisms. The 
total number of land related cases currently in court in 2004 is estimated at between 800,000 
and 3,200,000, and the average time of completion for cases is 9.5 years (2 sources Appendix 
B Table B.8). This is the aggregate not the annual figure of new cases. The source with the 
larger estimate also estimates that 150 million people are indirectly involved in these cases 
(including family members), more than the total population because many households are 
involved in multiple cases. We do not know the percentage of the total population involved in 
land and asset related litigation or the share of total cases that are land cases, but these figures 
suggest that land disputes are ubiquitous. 
 
Land disputes are often managed through informal political processes involving mastans who 
provide protection for a fee to those who can afford it and help to ‘resolve’ land disputes 
between relatives and neighbours, often in favour of those who can pay more or who are 
better connected. These activities can create new insecurities (as well as sometimes resolving 
conflicts) because mastans have strong incentives to seek out and exacerbate dormant 
problems based on conflicting land records or family disputes. Again, the available evidence 
suggests high levels of contestation but it is difficult to discern trends or cycles.  
 
Critical areas where information is lacking. 
Data and evidence are almost entirely lacking in a number of critical sub-categories:  
 
i) The impact of land-related violence on different vulnerable groups. There is no data 
that looks at the impact of land-related violence on people of different income classes and 
asset holdings. While the data on churning show that all income and asset classes are 
vulnerable to land grabbing, the poor may be much more vulnerable to violence, and some 
regions may be more vulnerable than others. We expect substantial class and regional 
differences given the differences in types of landholdings, and the ability of different classes 
to protect themselves. 
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ii) Impacts on the income and welfare of different groups. Similarly, the economic effects 
of land and asset contests may be very different for different income classes and in different 
regions. 
  
iii) The proportions of landholdings affected. To track changes in levels of contestation 
across years, we need to have estimates of the proportions of different types of landholdings 
affected by contestation. The different types of landholdings could be defined by size of 
holding, region, and location never urban centres.  
 
B-2) DRIVERS 
There are a number of important drivers of insecurity in this category. Some are closely 
related to drivers of insecurity in other categories, including in particular, insecurities 
associated with the political process. 
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iii) Administrative and Judicial Weaknesses. The weakness and culpability of the 
administrative and judicial systems can make property right conflicts much worse than they 
would otherwise have been. The police, the judiciary and bureaucrats in land record offices 
and elsewhere often collude with the politically powerful or act on their own initiative to 
exploit conflicts between neighbours and relatives to extract their resources or pervert the 
course of justice in return for appropriate payoffs. Figure 6 summarizes these drivers.  
 
CONSTRAINING AND EXACERBATING CHANGES IN DRIVERS 
i) Factional competition. Factional cycling constrains excessive appropriation as 
expropriators are aware that they may induce retaliation in the near future. Those who are 
threatened by appropriation can also limit damage if they can find competing factions willing 
to protect them for a relatively low price. The evidence of churning, particularly in rural 
areas, and the ability of many small holders of land to hold on to their assets supports this 
interpretation.  
 
ii) Rising land values. The rise in land values can upset this equilibrium by raising the stakes 
for land grabbing and creating strong incentives for ruling coalitions to try and monopolize 
political power. While this is likely to raise the intensity of contestation for a while, once land 
and assets pass into the hands of high productivity users who can afford to pay for their 
protection, contestation is likely to steeply decline. It is the interim period of intense 
contestation that is a source of concern, and given the high value of the prize, the faction or 
individual that can appropriate enough high value assets can permanently alter the balance of 
power. This raises the stakes in factional competition and can make conflict more violent.   
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B-3) TRENDS AND CYCLICAL VARIATIONS 
By combining available evidence with an analysis of drivers we can suggest some tentative 
conclusions that need to be further evaluated with better data in the future. The levels of 
insecurity in this category are high and there is some evidence that new conflicts and 
associated insecurities are intensifying in high-value urban and semi-urban areas with rapidly 
rising land values. Economic cycles in land conflicts are more difficult to identify as there are 
opposing tendencies here: economic downturns can increase the intensity of conflict in rural 
areas, but upturns can accelerate the rate of price appreciation and therefore conflicts over 
economically valuable land. 
 
Our tentative assessment is therefore of a downward trend in human security in this category, 
in Figure 7, but we do not have much evidence for this or for the rate of decline and therefore 
we have a largish question mark on the trend line. We know that the level of human security 
in this area is low, and the likely long-term trend is based on our analysis of drivers. The 
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across the board is not a realistic immediate policy, there are pragmatic steps that 
governments can take to significantly reduce insecurity in critical areas. These areas have to 
be selected through a process of dialogue and negotiation, but will incorporate two types of 
concerns. Some rights may be targeted for protection because of the vulnerability or poverty 
of the affected population. Other rights may be targeted because of the critical economic 
importance of some sectors.  
 
For instance, the growing incidence of primitive accumulation of valuable land is partly 
driven by the fact that genuine developers find it very difficult to acquire land that has poorly 
defined rights and multiple and competing claims over fragmented plots. The transaction 
costs of legal purchases are therefore very high. Land grabbers and mastans respond to these 
real problems, but they also make huge profits and are engaged in expropriation on their own 
account. 
 
An example where institutional capacities could be developed to make these critical 
economic transactions less subject to insecurity would be to establish a strong land 
development agency to facilitate the acquisition of land for development in a more 
transparent way. The aim would be to respond to industrial or residential land use 
requirements by responding to owners and individuals claiming an interest in the land in 
question, and using fast-tracked hearings to resolve competing claims. The strategy could 
also protect the vulnerable by requiring compensation for squatters if the land is already 
occupied. Much of the insecurity faced by squatters is associated with violent evictions from 
land with no compensation. Sellers could get an auction price of the land after paying for the 
costs of resolving competing claims and compensations. But they would very likely get a 
higher price for their land through this mechanism than if they had to deal with mastans or 
face political expropriation. On the other hand, potential developers may also find that they 
have to pay less than what they would otherwise have paid mastans to acquire the land using 
force, political connections and violence.  
 
We can expect attempts by the politically powerful to capture such an agency. But reform is 
most likely to work if a limited number of critical agencies are prioritized by reformers, if 
they have narrow and well-defined remits, and are led by enterprising and public-spirited 
individuals. There will inevitably be conflicts over land transactions in a land-scarce 
economy but if these conflicts are addressed in an institutionalized way, the insecurity in this 
sub-category can decline, and in this case, directly contribute to economic development.  
 
iii) Managing the stresses of development. The long-run solution to property right 
instability and conflicts is to create the fiscal space to pay for effective property right 
protection. But paradoxically, economic progress can have contrary effects in the short to 
medium-run. Rapid development can itself create an intensification of conflicts over the 
ownership of assets enjoying rapid value appreciation. An awareness of these tensions is 
critical for national policy-makers and donors to manage the transition and to devise interim 
solutions that can manage the intensification of conflicts in the short run. 
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C. HUMAN INSECURITY ASSOCIATED WITH CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM. 
Developing countries like Bangladesh typically perform very poorly in broad areas of 
administrative and judicial governance. The operation (or otherwise) of the administrative 
and judicial systems in turn directly and indirectly affects human security as these systems 
are supposed to deliver critical protection and services that are essential for guaranteeing 
security. 
 
C-1) AVAILABLE EVIDENCE 
i) Corruption. Corruption refers to many different types of illegal self-seeking activities by 
public officials. We know that different types of corruption have different effects (Khan 
2006), but in general corruption has significant negative effects on the delivery of public 
goods including justice. From the perspective of human security, bureaucratic and judicial 
corruption creates large costs and uncertainties in the access to public goods of all types 
including justice. Bangladesh continued to appear at the bottom of the TI country rankings 
for corruption (every year from 2001 to 2005). However, this is a perception based ranking 
and has serious methodological limitations in making international comparisons, and 
particularly for tracking corruption over time in a single country. More importantly, it does 
not help us to track year to year changes in the extent and incidence of different types of 
corruption affecting human security within Bangladesh. Nevertheless, the available evidence 
suggests that corruption has been at a high level in Bangladesh’s recent history. 
 
ii) Extra-judicial killings. A particularly severe aspect of insecurity is the likelihood of 
extra-judicial killings by the administrative system. In particular, this includes deaths in 
government custody and ‘cross-fire’, where suspected criminals die ostensibly trying to resist 
arrest. In the past these killings mainly involved the police, but in recent years, the activities 
of RAB have added to this threat. Comparing 2005 with 2004, extra-judicial killings 
increased. Police killings increased by between 8% and 161%, RAB killings increased by 
between 41% and 75%, (three sources in each case, Appendix B Table C.1). The police were 
responsible for around two-thirds of the total. Paradoxically, the worsening of insecurity in 
this sub-category was associated with general public approval of RAB activities, and a 
widely-based perception that security had improved in terms of protection from crime (see 
also later discussion on crime). 
 
iii) Arbitrary arrests by police and RAB. The Special Powers Act 1974 gives law 
enforcing agencies considerable latitude in arresting almost anyone, including occasionally, 
the political opposition. No government has been able to resist the temptation of using law 
enforcing agencies to pursue their own political goals. In addition, law enforcing agencies 
typically cut corners in pursuing criminals, sometimes handing out rough justice, which is 
often also appreciated by the local population. RAB’s own published data reports that they 
arrested a total of 4872 people in 2005, of whom only 7% had warrants against them, 15% 
were charged with ‘other’ charges and 4% were arrested under the Special Powers Act 1974 
(Appendix B Table C.2). We do not have figures to assess trends, but we can conclude that a 
high proportion of arrests are likely to be arbitrary in the sense that they are based on 
unknown evidence. 
 
iv) Inefficiency of judicial system and miscarriages of justice. Widespread anecdotal and 
case study evidence shows problems in the judicial system including some evidence of 
miscarriages of justice. The slowness of the judicial process has a big impact on insecurity in 
all sectors. For instance, the Bangladesh Mahila Parishad reports that two to five years are 
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required to settle cases of violence against women. Very obvious miscarriages of justice often 
take years to correct (see for instance Box 2 in Category Report C). 
 
Critical areas where information is lacking. 
Data and evidence are almost entirely lacking in a number of critical sub-categories:  
 
i) Impact of extractive demands by police and other public officials on different income 
classes. The trends in the proportion of individuals affected and the proportions of their 
incomes that are lost would be required to assess the impact of predatory corruption on 
vulnerable groups.  
 
ii) Weak information on arbitrary arrests and extra-judicial killings. Sample surveys are 
not the best way to get comparable information on arbitrary arrests or extra-judicial killings 
(because the numbers are small relative to Bangladesh’s population), but neither are 
collations of newspaper reports. The precedent established by RAB in publishing its own 
figures should be used to encourage agencies like the police to make their figures public. Our 
researchers were occasionally able to get figures for different categories of crimes from the 
police so we know figures exist and are more extensive than figures coming from the press 
(see Box 2). Official figures, however weak, would be a more consistent indication of annual 
changes compared to newspaper reports (which could serve as a secondary check).  
 
C-2) DRIVERS 
i) Pressures and incentives created by political accumulation strategies. In many but not 
all cases of bureaucratic and judicial failure, the root cause is pressure and incentives created 
by the political accumulation strategies of patron-client factions. Political accumulation is 
often impossible without the assistance or at least the deliberate inactivity of the police, local 
bureaucrats or the judiciary. Given the very significant resources generated through these 
processes, the incentives for participation on the part of the administrative and judicial 
bureaucracy are difficult to resist. Moreover, an individual bureaucrat opting out of these 
processes could threaten to block accumulation strategies of other politicians and bureaucrats 
and could therefore bring about their removal or relocation to less attractive areas.  
 
ii) Fiscal constraints prevent adequate financing of public goods. Fiscal constraints in 
developing countries can prevent the provision of infrastructure and salaries for effective 
public good provision, creating incentives for informal rationing through corruption and 
nepotism.   
 
iii) Limited accountability of public officials. Low levels of accountability allow 
bureaucrats, judges, policemen and others to engage in extraction from the public with 
impunity. This too is a contributory factor, but the question is whether the low level of 
accountability is independent of the other two drivers or derived from them. Given the low 
levels of resourcing and the political protection enjoyed by officials participating in patron-
client accumulation strategies, it may be difficult to achieve greater accountability for public 
officials without changes in the other drivers.  
 
In theory, some improvements may be possible. In particular, a number of archaic laws that 
protect public officials, such as the Official Secrets Act of 1931 and the Contempt of Court 
Act of 1938 could be revisited. Similarly, the Special Powers Act of 1974 is regularly 
misused. The problem is that such reforms are again unlikely given the usefulness of these 
powers to ruling factions.   
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 Figure 8 Drivers of insecurity associated with administrative and judicial systemsical drivers are summarized in Figure 8, which identifies the critical drivers where 
 can exacerbate or constrain insecurity. 
RAINING AND EXACERBATING CHANGES IN DRIVERS 
plining effect of elections and direct public action. While elections can limit the 
 done by ruling factions, the effects on the administrative and judicial system can be 
. The emergent practice in Bangladesh is for the top bureaucracy to be replaced by 
g governments. This imposes some discipline on the bureaucracy in the same way 
itical competition can constrain political factions. On the other hand, the limited time 
 of top bureaucrats can also induce them to be more predatory. The threat of public 
n the form of protests or even violence against poor service delivery or arbitrary 
has also played an occasional constraining role on the bureaucracy. 
ion, the competition between political factions means that individuals, particularly 
class ones, can mobilize contacts in competing factions (sometimes within the same 
 put pressure on bureaucrats or the police to limit the damage they would otherwise 
ven without power changing at the top.  
y intense political competition can exacerbate administrative insecurity. The 
e also suggests that very intense competition between factions can lead to more 
efforts by different parties to politicize the administration and the judiciary. During 
is was an important driver of increased insecurity. 
-level example of this is the growing politicization of the judiciary partly as a 
ence of the 12th Amendment setting up the constitutional provisions for caretaker 
trations in Bangladesh. The constitutional rule is that the head of the caretaker 
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government is to be the last retired Chief Justice, creating even stronger incentives for 
incumbent parties to appoint judges on a partisan basis. This experience also shows the 
limitations of trying to solve political problems by administrative means.  
 
iii) Authoritarian institutional responses: The RAB phenomenon. Occasionally in 
Bangladesh, the fragmentation of factions and the violence unleashed by their accumulation 
strategies provokes authoritarian responses by ruling groups to rein in the most anarchic, 
often within their own parties or coalitions. This history goes back to the Rakkhi Bahini set 
up by Mujib, and it is possible to see military takeovers as extreme variants on this theme. 
Initial public reactions to these exercises have often been positive, but not always.  
 
The public response to RAB has been positive, despite many cases of extra-legal killings and 
the use of Special Powers of arrest. The logic is that these things happen anyway, but at least 
with RAB there has been a perception that the activity of many mastans and criminal gangs 
has become more subdued, and the perception is that the security situation with respect to 
crime has improved.  
 
But Bangladeshi history also tells us that while a new agency with new powers can for a time 
operate outside the drivers of administrative insecurity described in Figure 8 this is always a 
temporary phenomenon. Sooner or later, these drivers ensure that the new agency begins to 
behave like any other. Indeed, this also happened to the military shortly after coming to 
power on a number of occasions in the seventies and eighties. The danger is that we may end 
up with a faction or series of factions in RAB who engage in standard factional accumulation 
strategies, but now armed with special powers.  
 
C-3) TRENDS AND CYCLICAL VARIATIONS 
We have no credible data to identify long-term trends in this category. The available evidence 
and evidence on the drivers suggests that there is a moderate to low level of human security 
in this category. Some long-run observations are worrying. The quality and competence of 
top bureaucrats appears to have gradually declined over the last three decades. The public 
services have found it difficult to compete with NGOs and the private sector in attracting the 
best candidates. As the numbers of people who are only interested in factional accumulation 
strategies grows within an organization, cumulative causation can rapidly set in driving out 
the rest. This suggests the possibility of a negative trend over time that we need to track 
carefully with better data.  
 
In addition, there is likely to be an electoral cycle in this insecurity, given its close connection 
with political drivers and the politicization of the administration. The intensification of 
political competition in the run-up to elections is likely to result in an intensification of 
politicization and involve the administration in actions like arbitrary arrests and intensified 





Figure 9 summarizes our assessment. We have no information on the long-run trend, so this 
line has a question mark attached. The deterioration reported in some of the available data is 
consistent with a cyclical electoral downturn. However, the deterioration associated with 
RAB is an exceptional phenomenon as discussed earlier. The electoral deterioration is likely 


































































 Figure 9 Human Security associated with the administrative and judicial systemsh the operation of RAB has met with broad popular support so far, we would assess 
ns as a source of deteriorating human security in this category. The possible and 
 improvement in security as a result of a reduction in crime will be discussed later.   
LICY IMPLICATIONS 
rs of political competition are critical. All of the policies aimed at the drivers of 
y associated with politics are relevant here because patron-client accumulation 
s are an important driver of insecurity in this category. Patron-client competition can 
ined at moderate levels of insecurity, and the realistic option for most developing 
s is to grope towards a ‘live and let live’ understanding between competing political 
as they pursue their political accumulation strategies.  
rtance of improving the quality of public personnel. Strengthening the quality and 
ersonnel in public service, at least in critical agencies must be an important goal. The 
rvices have to recreate a strong public service tradition and meritocratic elitism in 
ents. Having bigger budgets to pay middle and top bureaucrat proper salaries would 
y help, bringing to the fore once again issues of taxation and fiscal space.  
roving accountability in achievable and realistic ways. Greater transparency and 
val of laws protecting official secrecy, and greater accountability of public officials 
e helpful, but radical improvements are unlikely given the political drivers that are in 
erpinned by political accumulation strategies. However, focused reforms can make a 
ference and should be pursued. For instance, setting time limits before which retiring 
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bureaucrats and judges are not allowed to join political parties may help to break down the 
most obvious factional links that senior bureaucrats cultivate as their retirement approaches.  
 
iv) Decentralization and devolution are not necessarily panaceas. There is a common 
perception that decentralization and/or devolution may help to counter some of the 
insecurities in this category by improving the accountability of public servants. However, the 
jury is still out on the effects of decentralization and devolution on the overall insecurity 
associated with administrative and judicial failures. In particular, it is not clear how 
decentralization or devolution would change the drivers discussed in Figure 8. Factional 
competition, political accumulation strategies and the absence of fiscal resources to meet the 
redistributive demands of the organizationally powerful are just as strong if not stronger at 
lower levels of the political and administrative structure. We need to track with hard evidence 
whether the levels of devolution and decentralization that have already been achieved are 
resulting in greater human security in Bangladesh or simply a decentralization of violence 
and insecurity to lower levels of society. 
 
On the other hand, there are some issues where reform would help that are discussed in 
connection with decentralization but could be addressed independently. For instance, the 
construction of more courts, clinics and other service delivery facilities in smaller towns will 
certainly improve access to services and reduce aspects of insecurity associated with 
administrative and judicial failures. These changes are, however, strongly opposed by middle 
class administrative and judicial officers who do not want to spend time in the boondocks. 
Formally, an expansion of these facilities could happen within the existing administrative 
structure simply by constructing multiple facilities at the same tier of administration, for 
instance by having sittings of the High Court at multiple locations. 
 
v) Focusing on critical agencies is likely to be more fruitful compared to across-the-
board governance reforms. Given the overall fiscal constraints, it is not possible to feasibly 
improve the quality of the bureaucracy or judiciary across the board. Policy to improve the 
quality of the administration and judiciary is more likely to succeed if it focuses on a few 
critical areas where the impact of human insecurity is higher than average.  
 
Critical agencies can be defined in terms of areas where a high level of human insecurity is 
particularly damaging in terms of its economic or social effects. In our earlier discussion we 
argued that urban land-related conflicts may be one such area where insecurity has a 
disproportionate effect on economic development and we suggested that an effective land 
development agency may therefore have a high payoff in terms of limiting very damaging 
insecurity. Focusing scarce reform efforts and personnel in critical agencies may be the most 
realistic way of targeting the most serious insecurities. 
 
Similarly, attention could be focused on agencies that addressed the most critical social 
concerns of vulnerable group insecurity. One of our conclusions is that identifying the most 
vulnerable aspects of non-economic insecurity is difficult on the basis of the available data.  
 
In a very different way, the RAB is another agency that arguably responds to social concerns 
about human insecurity caused by crime and political factionalism crossing certain bounds. 
Even if we accept part of this argument, in all of these cases, early attention to recruitment 
and pay may prevent or delay the onset of absorption of critical agencies into factional 
political accumulation strategies.  
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D. VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN. 
Apart from the economic discrimination faced by women in terms of jobs and incomes, 
women in Bangladesh face a very restricted social space defined by culture. They also face a 
range of types of violence and discrimination, some very horrific like acid throwing, and 
others like trafficking that are common to other developing countries. There are a wide range 
of issues relevant for human insecurity in this category. There is a lot of available data that 
show high levels of insecurity but its quality is poor (based mostly on newspaper scanning), it 
shows different directions of change for the same sub-categories depending on the reporting 
agency, and it is difficult to assert any trends with confidence. 
 
D-1) AVAILABLE EVIDENCE 
i) Violence, both domestic and otherwise. For most sub-categories, the data from different 
agencies show conflicting directions of change in 2005 compared to 2004. 
a) Custodial violence. This refers to reports of violence against women including 
rape and sexual assault while in police or judicial custody. Up. Up 80% and 409% in two 
sources (Appendix B Figure D.7).  
b) Domestic violence. Unclear direction of change. Down by 33% and 48% in two 
sources and up by 62% in a third source (Appendix B Figure D.1). The reported category is 
‘Physical Torture’, which is a common term in Bangladesh for referring to (mainly) domestic 
violence. 
c) Female murders. Unclear direction of change. Down 67% in one source and up 
13% and 196% in two sources (Appendix B Table D.5). 
d) Dowry related violence. Unclear direction of change. Down between 2% and 4% 
in two sources and up by between 3% and 41% in three sources (Appendix B Table D.2). 
e) Rape. Down? Down by between 13% and 24% in 4 sources but with a small 
recorded increase of 1% in one source. (Appendix B Table D.3) 
f) Acid violence. Down. (between 36% and 46%, five sources Appendix B Table 
D.4). Although most victims are women, our sources include male victims in the aggregate 
figures. 
 
ii) Female Suicide as an indicator of hidden violence and repression. Unclear direction of 
change. Down 12% and 99% in two sources and up 17% in another source (Appendix B 
Table D.5). 
 
iii) Kidnappings and abductions. There is a widespread perception that this is a growing 
problem. Middle class and lower middle class parents of girls face daily fears, particularly if 
their children are perceived to be good-looking. Unclear direction of change. Down 8% and 
26% in two sources and up 18% in third source (Appendix B Figure D.3). 
 
iv) Trafficking of women and prostitution. There is certainly greater media awareness of 
these problems, and with the associated problem of disease and AIDS. Unclear direction of 
change. Reported cases of trafficking up 14% and 715% in two sources and down 29% in a 
third source (Appendix B Figure D.4). 
 
v) Restrictions of the ‘social space’ available to women. This refers to social restrictions 
beyond the restrictions set by differential economic opportunities open to women. One 
measure of this is the incidence of fatwa-based punishments against women. Up. Up between 
17% and 31% (two sources, Appendix B Figure D.5). Fatwa based punishments are often 
barbaric and can involve for instance flogging and stoning for ‘crimes’ such as alleged extra-
marital relationships.  
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Critical areas where information is lacking. 
The available data in this category bring out most clearly the dangers of relying on newspaper 
reports to collect data that can inform policy on human security (see also Box 2). The data 
indicate wildly different magnitudes and directions of changes across sources and are in any 
case not scalable to identify levels of risk.  
 
Data is also missing to measure the impact of violence and discrimination of each type on 
women in different income classes.  
 
D-2) DRIVERS 
A very wide range of drivers are potentially at play here. Indeed, variants of discrimination 
and violence against women can persist in more developed and open economies with higher 
levels of education and more liberal cultures. We focus on drivers that are particularly 
applicable for a developing country like Bangladesh.  
 
i) Limited economic opportunities. The absence of employment opportunities for women is 
an important constraint limiting women’s social opportunities and therefore their bargaining 
power in legal and cultural debates. The dramatic growth of employment of poor women in 
the garment industry is often criticized for exploitation and poor conditions but in fact it has 
contributed to opening up the social options for a broad class of women and made some 
progressive social changes more likely. Female employment tripled in the 1990s to reach 9.1 
million in 2000, compared to a 10% increase in male employment over the same period to 
33.6 million.  
 
A continued rapid growth in female employment is highly desirable, with an onus on policy-
makers to regulate working conditions and encourage productivity and thereby wage growth 
in sectors employing women. But in the short run, rapid growth in female employment can 
also spark off a conservative backlash by traditionalists worried about values and ways of 
life. Managing these concerns is much easier if employment is growing across the economy.  
 
ii) Discriminatory Laws. The legal situation is also a cause for concern. In some areas there 
are already strong legal sanctions protecting women, including the death penalty for acid 
throwing and abductions, and for attempted murders of women for dowry. Together with the 
activity of campaigning groups and public awareness, there is some evidence that these 
measures are reducing the scale of acid throwing. In other areas, the law is biased against 
women, particularly in areas of inheritance and divorce. These biases have ramifications 
beyond their immediate effects as they establish women and men as having different sets of 
legal rights. 
 
iii) Cultures and values. The traditional cultural and religious context also sets limits to the 
range of possible reforms that are possible, particularly in the legal sphere. For instance, 
although Bangladesh has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, it recorded reservations on articles 2 and 16.1(c) which were 
thought to be in contradiction with shariah law. This means that laws regarding divorce, child 
custody, maintenance and inheritance can continue to be discriminatory. At the same time, 
we know from our own history that shariah law is not an immutable obstacle. One of the 
most radical jumps in women’s rights in terms of family law happened in Bangladesh when it 
was part of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a result of the introduction of the Muslim 
Family Laws Ordinance in 1961. This ordinance radically improved the protection available 
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to women in family law cases. While cultures and values do constrain change, they are not 
immutable. But they are best changed through a process of creating new progressive facts on 
the ground rather than through head on confrontations.  
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Figure 11 Violence and discrimination against women 
 
 
D-4) POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
i) Sustaining employment and wage growth. Sustaining growth in labour-intensive sectors 
where poor women can find employment is vital. The labour problems in 2006 in some 
garment factories also show the importance of proper labour regulations and the need to 
encourage and achieve productivity growth. 
 
ii) Education and culture. Countering the conservative educational agenda of some religious 
groups is best done by finding and managing the resources to set up high-quality secular 
educational establishments at all levels. Liberals in Bangladesh have been too ready to blame 
external sources of funding for madrasas without asking why despite much more aid coming 
to Bangladesh from western sources, the quality of education in secular schools has remained 
poor regardless of the party in power. 
 
iii) Addressing legal discrimination issues. In the longer run, the legal discrimination 
against women in a number of fields has to be addressed. The historical evidence is that, 
paradoxically, effective reforms in these areas in conservative cultures are as or more likely 
to be achieved by strong reformist centre-right parties as centre-left ones. Centre-left parties 
are often too concerned to protect their flanks to engage in controversial reforms in a 
conservative culture. In Bangladesh, however, neither the BNP nor the Awami League has so 
far taken a lead in difficult reforms in this area.  
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E. VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND 
OTHER COMMUNITY GROUPS.  
Members of ethnic, religious and other community groups are likely to face additional 
insecurities due to their greater vulnerability and because extremist ideological political 
factions can target them. We include in this category the insecurities faced by Bangladesh’s 
Hindu minority (10.5% of its population), the indigenous population (between 1 to 2% of the 
population) concentrated in the Chittagong Hill Tracts but with a presence in a number of 
other areas, the Ahmadiyya community (precise numbers unavailable), and other social 
groups like the Hijras. There are around 45 different ethnic minority groups living in 
Bangladesh. Many of the insecurities faced by these groups are very similar to those faced by 
the majority community with the added difference that smaller communities are more 
vulnerable, have fewer points of contact with competing factions in the political parties and 
administration to defend themselves, and therefore are often seen as soft targets for the land 
appropriation and other extractive strategies of political accumulators. A separate and more 
serious problem that occasionally emerges is that minorities can become victims of 
ideologically or politically motivated hate crimes.  
 
E-1) AVAILABLE EVIDENCE 
i) Deaths attributable to inter-community violence. Violent deaths in Chittagong Hill 
Tracts (CHT) were down in 2005 compared to 2004 by 39% to 25 deaths according to a 
single source (Appendix B Table E.10). For the Hindu community, we have reports of 12 
deaths in 2005 (no figures available for 2004) (Appendix B Table E.4). The absolute numbers 
of deaths for the Hindu community are low given the size of this community and data cannot 
be scaled up to indicate the level of risk faced by the Hindu community nationally (see Box 
2). But a comparison with deaths during the run-up to the 2001 election reported by the same 
agency suggests a decline in the levels of violence. In that election year 17 deaths were 
reported (Appendix B Table E.7). However, the next election is in 2007, so we need to assess 
levels of violence in late 2006 and early 2007 to see if the public outcry against the violence 
faced by the Hindu community in 2001 has had an effect. We also need to be able to compare 
the cyclical decline in the security of the Hindu community during elections with the general 
decline in security faced by the entire population during elections to see if the Hindu 
community are subject to additional insecurities. The available data do not allow us to make 
this assessment. 
 
To assess the extra risk faced by minority groups, we should exclude deaths due to conflicts 
where the ethnic or religious identity of the victim was accidental. In practice this distinction 
may be difficult to make, so an alternative strategy would be to compare the incidence of all 
violent deaths in a minority community group with the incidence in the average population. A 
difference between the two proportions would indicate a higher insecurity facing particular 
communities. To do this we would need to have data on all violent deaths suffered by 
different communities (and not just those assessed by newspapers as being due to communal 
violence) to compare with the figure for the overall population. 
 
ii) Injuries resulting from inter-community violence. Injuries of Ahmadis in anti-
Ahmadiyya violence declined in 2005 from an estimate of around 50 in 2004 to an estimate 
of around 18. (Appendix B Table E.3). Reported injuries in CHT also declined in 2005 
compared to 2004 by 64%, to 71 (Appendix B Table E.10). 
 
Reported injuries of Hindus in anti-Hindu violence in 2004 numbered 351 with no figures 
available for 2004 (Appendix B Table E.4). A comparison with injuries and deaths during the 
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run-up to the 2001 election reported by the same agency suggests a substantial decline in the 
levels of violence. In that election year 666 Hindus were reported as injured (Appendix B 
Table E.7). However, the next election is in 2007, so we need to assess levels of violence in 
late 2006 and early 2007 to see if the electoral cycle in violence repeats itself. 
 
iii) Arrests. Evidence available from the CHT suggests a decline in arrests in 2005 by 67% to 
35 (Appendix B Table E.10). 
 
iv) Abductions. Evidence from the CHT suggests a decline in abductions in 2005 by 36% to 
81 (Appendix B Table E.10). 
 
v) Attacks on places of worship. The number of attacks on Ahmadiyya mosques declined 
from 9 to 5 (Appendix B Table E.3), but there were more bomb attacks, up from 0 to 2 
(Appendix B Table E.3). 
 
vi) Discrimination in employment. The available evidence on levels does not indicate 
serious discrimination. Representation of Hindus and Buddhists in government jobs was 
almost exactly equal to their share of the population, while Christian representation was 
almost three times their population share (Appendix B Table E.2). The latter probably reflects 
better than average educational attainments in the Christian community. But we have no 
figures on representation at different levels of employment or in the private sector. 
 
vii) Discrimination in political representation. Hindu representation in parliament in 2005 
was less than 1%, compared to their 10.5% share in the population but the indigenous 
population was proportionately represented with around a 1% share of the population 
(Appendix B Table E.1). These figures reflect to some extent the political marginalization of 
Hindus but also reflect the fact that Bangladesh has a first-past-the-post electoral system. The 
indigenous population is concentrated in some geographical areas while Hindus are more 
widely dispersed. As a result, Hindus can only be elected on mainly Muslim votes, but 
indigenous representatives can win on a largely indigenous vote. Nevertheless, the figures for 
Hindu representation are very low. 
 
Areas where data and evidence are missing. 
i) Gender violence against minorities. Very low absolute numbers (single digit) are reported 
for violence against Hindu women in 2005 in the only available source (Appendix B Table 
E.5) and for women in CHT (Appendix B Table E.10). This type of reporting on the basis of 
patchy newspaper coverage gives a false sense of statistical objectivity.  
 
ii) Risk of asset loss faced by minorities. Available statistics for attacks on Hindu property in 
2004 suggest relatively low levels of risk given the general insecurity faced by the population 
as a whole (Appendix B Table E.6). Without comparable figures for all communities, the 
degree of insecurity cannot be assessed.  
 
iii) Extensive data on some minorities like Ahmadiyyas and Biharis, and social minorities 
like hijras is almost entirely missing. 
 
iv) Extrapolation to national proportions is particularly important for data in this category 
because we want to compare insecurity for these subgroups with the average Bangladeshi 
levels of insecurity. The specific insecurity in this category has to be established as a 
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difference in the levels of insecurity compared to the average, where the average insecurity is 
not by any means low.  
 
E-2) DRIVERS 
The drivers of ethnic and religious violence are likely to be very different from the drivers of 
violence against other groups like the hijras. We will focus on the former at this stage given 
the almost total absence of data and evidence on other types of minority groups. Figure 12 
shows a number of the most important drivers.  
 
Drivers 
of insecurity (political, 
administrative, judicial, 
gender, crime) shared with 
general population
Political, 
legal, social factors 
creating additional 
vulnerabilities for these 
groups
Ideological agendas that 
target some groups for 
political purposes
Violence and Discrimination against 
ethnic and religious groups
Insecurity exacerbated or limited 
by:
External events (eg treatment of Muslims in India)
Factional competition during elections
  
Figure 12 Drivers of Insecurity for Ethnic and Religious Groups 
 
i) General drivers of human insecurity. Ethnic and religious groups suffer from the general 
insecurities faced by the entire population. The drivers of insecurity due to the operation of 
politics, the administration, the judiciary, conflicts over land and gender discrimination that 
have been already discussed operate for minorities too. 
 
ii) Specific legal and political disadvantages. In addition, minorities suffer from specific 
legal and political disadvantages that make them more vulnerable to attack by factions 
engaged in political accumulation. These legal and political disadvantages vary across 
communities. For the Hindu minority, the history of political disadvantage goes back to 
animosities created during the partition of Bengal and continuing political tensions with 
India, which in turn have sustained a number of legal disadvantages that have made some 
Hindu properties vulnerable. These laws include the Vested Property Act and the Vested 
Property Return Bill of 2001 (see Category Report E). In addition, the departure of many 
middle class and wealthy Hindus to India from 1947 onwards has meant that Hindus still 
remaining in Bangladesh are predominantly poor and socially disadvantaged. These factors 
make many Hindus soft targets for political accumulators as they are less likely to mobilize 
their own contacts in political factions to protect themselves.  
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The indigenous population in the CHT face more overt political disadvantages as successive 
Bangladeshi governments have taken policy decisions to open up access to indigenous lands 
for plains people to relieve pressure on land elsewhere. This political context has allowed 
many individual political entrepreneurs to illegally capture indigenous lands, extract 
revenues, engage in illegal logging and smuggling, and in some cases, sexually exploit 
indigenous women. Addressing these special disadvantages would obviously improve the 
situation for religious and ethnic minorities.  
 
iii) Ideological agendas attacking specific minorities. The third driver is more worrying 
because it refers to ideological agendas that are not part of the standard accumulation 
strategies of political entrepreneurs. These agendas are potentially much more sinister as the 
intention is to achieve other goals using minorities as scapegoats. Developing countries often 
suffer from internal disunity, and unfortunately a common but ultimately futile strategy is to 
try to unite the majority community by finding and attacking a scapegoat minority.  
 
For instance, it is difficult to understand the attacks against Ahmadis except as a strategy of 
some extreme Islamic groups to create a greater Islamic unity by identifying ‘deviants’ and 
hoping to rouse large numbers of passive Muslims to appreciate the importance of ideological 
unity and discipline. These attacks were not primarily driven by the intention to capture 
Ahmadi land or extract resources from them. Some attacks on Hindus coming from 
ideological Muslim factions are also of this type, as indeed are attacks on Muslims in India 
coming from extremists in the BJP and other Hindu religious organizations.  
 
CONSTRAINING AND EXACERBATING CHANGES IN DRIVERS 
Exacerbating factors include the ones relevant for other types of insecurities as minorities are 
subject to the same drivers. In particular, there is a possible electoral cycle in violence against 
Hindus, largely because they are seen as a vote bank for the Awami League. Both major 
parties have been reported to use threats of violence either to prevent or to encourage Hindus 
to vote in particular ways. However, the seriousness of cyclical declines can vary from cycle 
to cycle, with a particularly serious decline during the 2001 elections. We are unable to assess 
the degree of extra risk faced by minority communities during election cycles, as there is a 
general decline in security across the board during elections and local factions frequently use 
threats against vulnerable constituencies to persuade them to vote in particular ways and 
attack each other’s vote banks. Both the second and third drivers can deteriorate as a result of 
deteriorations in external conditions. In particular, violence against Muslims in India can 
provoke violence against Bangladeshi Hindus by Muslim extremist groups, as we saw during 




E-3) TRENDS AND CYCLICAL VARIATIONS 
This limited information is summarized in Figure 13. We have no credible information on 
long-term trends. There is some evidence of a cyclical improvement in 2005 compared to 
2004 but based on data and evidence in which we have low confidence. Our analysis of 
drivers also suggests that the general political crisis emerging in 2006 could have an effect 
on security in this category unless a resolution can be rapidly found. This possibility is 


































Likely drift if factional conflict 
intensifies in run-up to elections
TREND ?
Figure 13 Violence and Discrimination against religious and ethnic groups 
 
E-4) POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
i) Many long-term drivers are similar to those facing the general population. Any 
vulnerable group is particularly attractive for political predation, and minorities are 
vulnerable for the types of reasons discussed. However, many groups within the majority 
community are also vulnerable to the same drivers.  
 
ii) Legal and political disadvantages. In addition, many minorities suffer specific legal and 
political disadvantages that need to be addressed. The Vested Property Act and the Vested 
Property Return Bill of 2001 are examples.  
 
iii) Countering scapegoat strategies. The third driver is potentially the most worrying for 
the security of minorities. Attempts to create new more united political coalitions by 
attacking minorities have always failed in Bangladesh. But more could be done by civil 
society groups across the Indian subcontinent to create greater public awareness that these 
strategies have always failed to achieve greater internal unity (at the expense of the minority) 
wherever they have been tried in the Indian subcontinent. The example of the BJP in India is 
a salutary one and not enough comparisons and discussions take place across our borders to 
analyse common problems and challenges.  
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F. HUMAN INSECURITY DRIVEN BY CRIME  
Political accumulation strategies of patron-client factions can often blur into the activities of 
criminal gangs that operate with political protection. This has made the escalation of different 
types of crime in Bangladesh difficult to contain or manage.  
 
F-1) AVAILABLE EVIDENCE 
We have already looked at most of the available evidence on crime in our other category 
assessments. For 2005 we have already reported available newspaper-based sources on the 
following: deaths and injuries during political conflicts (up), political kidnappings and 
abductions (up), attacks on journalists (contradictory reports on directions of change), rapes 
(down in most reports), domestic violence (contradictory reports), acid attacks (down), 
murders of women (contradictory reports), and trafficking of women (contradictory reports).  
 
There were no additional data we could collect for changes in levels of crime in 2005. 
However, we have some more data on levels, with the usual caveats about the data.   
 
i) Narcotics. The RAB website reports 3468 cases of narcotics related crime in 2005. This is 
a growing area of concern in Bangladesh, but we need much better incidence data, and also 
data on types of narcotics being used (Appendix B Table F.17).  
 
ii) Involvement of law-enforcing agencies in crime. Police (and RAB) officers are 
themselves frequently involved in crime and transgressions of rules. According to one report 
that gives a breakdown by categories of officers, more than half of the entire service received 
various levels of punishment over the 4-year period from 2002-2006 (Appendix B Table 
F.16). 
 
iii) Qualitative evidence of a growing brutalization of society. The gradual brutalization of 
society is particularly worrying as violence is not always perpetrated by criminals, but 
sometimes also by their victims. It is common for suspected criminals ranging from 
pickpockets to truck drivers involved in fatal accidents to be beaten to death or close to death 
by angry passers-by. Suspected thieves apprehended in rural areas may be summarily 
punished by having their eyes gouged out. These frequent examples of summary revenge, and 
indeed the frequent crime of acid throwing by young men who believe they are in love with 
the victim, are worrying indicators of deep social malaise. 
 
Missing Data.  
i) Impact on different income classes. For a proper assessment of human insecurity we 
would have liked to assess the impact of different types of crime on individuals in different 
income classes.  
 
ii) Extortion and Protection Rackets. Protection rackets are extremely lucrative in large 
bazaars and hats, where mastans operate with political protection. We have no data on the 
incidence of protection money extracted from different income classes or businesses of 
different sizes. This information would help to assess the insecurity of different groups.  
 
F-2) DRIVERS 
The ‘normal’ drivers of crime are serious enough and even advanced countries have levels of 
crime that are often hard to contain. However, Figure 14 shows that in developing countries 
like Bangladesh, there are two other drivers that make crime a major source of human 
insecurity.  
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protection of and 








Brutalization of society resulting in summary 
punishments and vigilante action, 
Divisions and competition between factions, 
Limits imposed by self-interest of ruling groups (the 
RAB phenomena)
Exacerbated by:
Global crime, trafficking, drugs and arms networks
i) Normal drivers of crime. These include drivers like poverty, opportunism, and drug 
addiction. 
Figure 14 Drivers of Crime
 
ii) Political protection of crime as a source of off-budget funds. We have seen in our 
discussion of political insecurity, political factions require off-budget funds to meet the 
demands of their clients and to maintain their organizational power in contests with other 
factions (who are offering their clients similar payoffs). Crime bosses, who manage local 
protection rackets, organize smuggling, corner markets or engage in extortion can then 
become attractive assets for competing factions. In some cases political factions can provide 
protection and cover to criminal activities, in other cases, crime bosses or mastans can 
themselves become political players and gain respectability as politicians who can ‘deliver’. 
Once this happens, the fight against crime becomes a sporadic event targeting ‘freelance’ 
criminals, while ‘protected’ criminals are ignored or let off. Occasionally, a few protected 
criminals may be targeted by law enforcement agencies, particularly after changes of power 
at the centre when a new group takes over, or when transgressions have been particularly 
egregious and the public or vigilante groups threaten to take matters into their own hands, or 
as a result of factional disagreements within ruling groups and/or law enforcement agencies. 
 
iii) Administrative and judicial weaknesses. The administration and the judiciary can 
themselves be sources of insecurity because of similar accumulation strategies of individuals 
and factions within these agencies. Often linked to political factions and operating in informal 
collusion, the administration and political processes are closely implicated in many aspects of 
crime, as the figures on numbers of police personnel punished demonstrates.  
 
CONSTRAINING AND EXACERBATING CHANGES IN DRIVERS 
i) Possible incorporation of crime into global networks. Exacerbating the internal drivers 
is the possibility of integration into global networks involved in drugs, guns, human 
trafficking and arms. We have no knowledge of the seriousness of these links in Bangladesh, 
but it is possible that links already exist or may develop in the future and this will strengthen 
internal crime networks.  
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ii) Growing brutalization of society. The worrying brutalization of society and the increased 
willingness of ordinary citizens to mete out horrific punishments keeps crime in check. But 
the brutalization of society obviously has very damaging long-term effects. The incidence of 
acid crimes in Bangladesh has to be understood in this context of brutalization.  
 
iii) Checks imposed by the self-interest of ruling groups. Finally, ruling groups in 
Bangladesh occasionally act to moderate aspects of political appropriation in their own self-
interest. This is particularly true because much of the political appropriation is often led by 
lower level factions from which the ruling coalition may not necessarily benefit. The 
occasional emergence of agencies like RAB can have an immediate effect on reducing some 
of the excesses of criminal activities, but as we discussed earlier, these effects are not likely 
to be permanent given the drivers of insecurity associated with government agencies.  
 
F-3) TRENDS AND CYCLICAL VARIATIONS 
Figure 15  summarizes the mixed evidence, based on the available data, but primarily based 
on an analysis of change in some of the drivers. The entry of RAB as a new agency is likely 
to have played a constraining role in the development of underlying trends in human security 
associated with crime. We do not know the underlying trends (question mark in the figure), 
but if the trend was moderately negative, RAB could be expected to have moderated this at 
least for some types of crime for a while. There is some weak evidence from changes in 
drivers (particularly RAB activities) and public perceptions that aspects of security affected 
by crime improved in 2005. But our analysis also suggests that these improvements (if they 
are genuine and not largely perception-based) are at risk of being short term.  
 
It is important to remember that limited improvements in this category were achieved at the 
cost of a worsening in human security in terms of deaths in custody and in crossfire, referred 
to in our discussion of the administrative and judicial systems (Figure 9). In addition, our 
analysis also tells us we have to be cautious about the permanence of what has been achieved. 
As part of the administrative and judicial system, RAB is subject to the drivers pushing 
agencies into factional accumulation strategies (Figure 8). There is a high likelihood of a 
reversion of the trend unless more substantial drivers of political and bureaucratic 
accumulation are addressed. If agencies like RAB are to survive with a moderate degree of 
effectiveness, attention also has to be given to ring-fence these agencies with appropriate pay 
structures, recruitment and training strategies and (most difficult of all) a consensus amongst 


















Likely reversion of trend
2005
TREND ?
Figure 15 Crime and Human Security  
 
F-4) POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
i) Importance of addressing deeper drivers. Fighting crime effectively in a clientelist 
polity requires attention to areas that may not appear to be closely related, such as achieving 
improvements in the fiscal space to enable more political demands to be accommodated 
within the budget, creating legitimate employment and accumulation opportunities for youth, 
particularly from the intermediate classes, and strengthening key administrative agencies.  
 
ii) Punitive anti-crime strategies have questionable long-term sustainability. Strategies 
focusing directly on arresting or eliminating criminals (RAB is a prime example) can appear 
to yield quick improvements in security but they are not likely to be permanent. This does not 
mean that attempts to improve the efficiency of the police or of RAB are not important. But it 
does mean that we should be realistic about how feasible sustained improvement in these 
agencies can be without changing some of the other drivers.  
 
iii) Improving the accountability of law enforcement agencies is a slow process. Reform 
efforts that focus on improving the accountability of law enforcing agencies and using public 
pressure to challenge the apparent impunity of well-known crime bosses or political mastans 
are not likely to yield quick results. These reform efforts should be sustained but our analysis 





An important message coming out of this assessment is that very powerful crosscutting 
drivers affect most of our human security categories. In particular, political accumulation 
strategies play a critical role, in turn driven by the limited attractiveness of the employment 
and legitimate accumulation opportunities open to large swathes of politically powerful 
intermediate classes. Another common driver across many of our categories is the weakness 
of bureaucratic and judicial capacities, and pressures and incentives on these services to align 
with political accumulation strategies. The interlocking of political and administrative drivers 
for many critical human insecurities can help to explain why attempts at piecemeal reforms of 
governance that have sought to improve the accountability of governments and public 
officials appear not to have delivered significant results.  
 
Secondly, our analysis of drivers suggests that even a clientelist political system has internal 
constraining factors that can keep moderate to high levels of insecurity at a stable and 
therefore manageable level. These factors are particularly important because they explain the 
difference between a political system that suffers from insecurity but can continue to perform 
and one that suffers greater and greater insecurity and ultimately collapses into virtual 
anarchy or into a fragmented polity controlled by competing warlords. Keeping an eye on 
these often informal mechanisms of balance can give advance warning of serious emerging 
problems.  
 
Thirdly, within the dynamics of the system, there are nevertheless small, pragmatic reforms 
that can be pursued to weaken some of the drivers of human security, and we have discussed 
some of the most obvious ones in connection with each of our categories. 
 
Finally, our examination of the data has identified serious shortcomings in the methods being 
used to monitor human security in Bangladesh. A credible monitoring system requires a 
sample survey approach to monitor small numbers of sub-categories of insecurity that can 
(over time) be combined with an analysis of drivers to provide early warning of potential 
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